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REVOLUTION IN MANIPULATION LAW: THE NEW
CFTC RULES AND THE URGENT NEED FOR
ECONOMIC AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg,† & Andrew
Verstein‡
ABSTRACT
Three major banks have now admitted that their employees
manipulated worldwide interest rates through the London Interbank
Offered Rate (Libor), the most widely used interest rate index. Libor is the
interest rate term for trillions of dollars of swaps and loans, and its
manipulation may have been used to extract billions of dollars. These
allegations come just as commodities manipulation law has been
dramatically reformed and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) given vast new regulatory powers. This Article provides the first
extended, scholarly analysis of the CFTC’s new anti-manipulation rules.
We consider the difficulty the rules address: Commodities manipulation
claims have traditionally faced nearly insuperable obstacles to success in
prosecuting manipulations like that of Libor. We then analyze the new
rules, including their extension of the CFTC’s powers to cover the swap
market. The new rules appropriately lower the standards of pleading and
proof, and yet the breadth of the new rules invites abuse. Both to
implement the new rules and to prevent overuse, we argue for more
elaborate, sophisticated, and creative economic analysis than ever before.
We provide a wide-ranging overview of empirical tools for assessing
manipulation claims, while re-engaging a decades-old debate on the place
of empiricism in the laws of evidence and intent. We provide detailed
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examples of how manipulation screens are necessary to complete the
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INTRODUCTION
Commodities manipulation claims have always been a mug’s game.1
Lacking so much as a definition within any statute, rule, or case, the
concept of commodities manipulation is profoundly confused. Amidst the
law’s confusion, advice from scholars varies. There is no scholarly
consensus as to the existence of manipulation, let alone the appropriate
definition and avenue for prevention.
What emerges from the confusion is an almost unwinnable set of
burdens. Plaintiffs must establish a manipulative intent that is conceptually
and doctrinally among the most demanding mental state requirements
anywhere in financial law. Moreover, the evidence for such intent is
typically only highly ambiguous public behavior. Plaintiffs must also
establish that the defendant’s conduct causally resulted in an “artificial
price,” the definition of which is again confused and burdensome. Worst
of all, courts have often been hostile to the use of statistical and economic
arguments in buttressing and evaluating manipulation claims.
Unsurprisingly, the CFTC has won only one case in thirty-seven
years.2 Private plaintiffs are likely to prefer to plead Sherman Act section
2, which does not require a showing of intent, and which has long been
amenable to economic analysis. Even the Sherman Act’s challenging
market power element is just one part of manipulation’s price artificiality
element.
Yet, all at once, dramatic manipulation reform has arrived. The law
governing market manipulation has been significantly altered: language
tracking securities fraud prohibitions has been added, an attempt prong
incorporated, and the scope of manipulation extended to include reckless
manipulative conduct.
Also, under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC is instructed to regulate swaps,
which are no longer exempt from the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).3

1. See, e.g., Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on
Dealing with Market Manipulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 391 (1991) (observing that “the
seventy-year effort by the federal government to eliminate . . . market manipulations has
been more or less unsuccessful”); Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures
Prices—The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991).
2. See Andrew N. Kleit, Index Manipulation, the CFTC, and the Inanity of DiPlacido
(Am. Enter. Inst. Reg-Markets Working Paper No. 09-06, 2009) (explaining that the CFTC
charged NYMEX floor broker Anthony DiPlacido and traders with Avista Energy with
manipulation and attempted manipulation of settlement prices of the Palo Verde and
California-Oregon Border electricity futures contracts traded on NYMEX from April
through July of 1998). Note, however, that the CFTC has settled many claims.
3. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111203, tit.VII (2010).
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Dodd-Frank explicitly creates anti-manipulation rules that apply to swaps
and commodities alike.4 With a mandate and significantly expanded antimanipulation authority under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC has adopted potent
new regulations to prosecute manipulation under the CEA.5 Although these
new powers are broad and potentially dangerous, they are responding to
increasing concern about the swap market.
Regulation of swaps is of profound importance. At least $500 trillion
dollars in notional value are at stake in the global swap market. This
money has hitherto operated in a largely legally unaccountable space,
uncleared and subject to opaque management; one need only remember the
concerns at the time of the AIG, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns
failures to remember the systemic worries of swap failure.6
Abuses in the swap market underlie today’s biggest financial story.
Media, academics, consultants, regulators, and plaintiffs are increasingly
focused on the $400 trillion dollar interest rate swap market as allegations
surface that Libor, the benchmark for most of the world’s swaps,7 may have
been manipulated.8 All over the world, major banks are admitting their
employees’ complicity in one of the greatest financial heists in history.9
Altering the interest rates paid by home mortgage borrowers and received
by pension funds may have generated billions of dollars of illicit profits. If
Congress was content to allow commodities manipulation before, it has

4. Id. § 753.
5. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices; Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398 (July 14, 2011).
6. See, e.g., Editorial, AIG and Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2009, at A26
(suggesting that “[f]or the last year, the entire Beltway theory of the financial panic has been
based on the claim that the ‘opaque,’ unregulated CDS market had forced the Fed to take
over AIG and pay off its counterparties, lest the system collapse”).
7. LIBOR: The world’s most important number, MONEYWEEK, Oct. 10, 2008,
available at http://www.moneyweek.com/personal-finance/libor-the-worlds-most-importan
t-number-13816; BBA LIBOR: The world’s most important number now tweets daily, BBA
LIBOR, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.bbalibor.com/news-releases/bba-libor-theworlds-most-important-number-now-tweets-daily; Donald McKenzie, What’s in a Number?,
30 LONDON REV. BOOKS 11 (2008) (noting that “Libor anchors contracts totaling about $300
trillion, the equivalent of $45,000 for every human being on the planet”); cf. Carrick
Mollenkamp, Libor Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr.
16, 2008, at A1 (reporting that $500 trillion in contracts are indexed to Libor); INT’L
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: FINANCIAL STRESS AND
DELEVERAGING—MACROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY xv (2008) (observing that
“the LIBOR rates are estimated to underpin some $400 trillion of financial derivatives
contracts”).
8. See Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate,
WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A1.
9. Jean Eaglesham, Paul Vieira & David Enrich, Traders Manipulated Key Rate,
Bank Says, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2012, at C1.
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signaled that commodities exchange prosecution is not to be dead letter.
Swaps are simply too important and too relevant to slip through the cracks.
In response to these dramatic events and shifts in the legal landscape,
this Article makes three principal contributions. It serves as the first
scholarship to examine and explain the new CEA anti-manipulation
powers. In explicating these provisions, this Article explains the
deficiencies the new provisions were meant to address, as well as the
shortcomings and risks of the new manipulation rules. Second, it urges the
increased use of statistical and economic tools in the evaluation of
manipulation claims, arguing for their particular importance in this domain.
Third, it provides examples of how courts have used such tools, and how
they might best use them in the future.
The structure of the Article is as follows. In Part I, we explore and
define manipulation. We then examine the law and theory of commodities
manipulation as it existed prior to Dodd-Frank. In Part II, we explain the
changes within and attendant to Dodd-Frank and provide a rationale for
some of the most controversial parts of these reforms, including a lowered
scienter requirement. In Part III, we then urge increased use of statistical
and economic tools in the evaluation of manipulation claims, particularly at
the pleading stage. These screens should be used offensively and
defensively. Many manipulation schemes will be initially detected only by
screens. Conversely, courts may wish to spare defendants the expense of
discovery where there is scanty statistical evidence of manipulation. This
will help limit the intimidating reach of the new rules. In the process, we
give extensive examples of how these screens might work, based both on
theory and on our professional experiences.
Arguments about the appropriate weight that should be given to
empirical analyses in litigating intent belong to the genetic code of
evidence law and scholarship.10 They can delve into the deep weeds of
statistical detail, but they are ultimately disputes as to the epistemology of
courts and agencies—arguments about how it is possible for a fact finder to
know the facts upon which a judgment must ultimately rest. This Article
10. Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. L. REV. 673
(1986); Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal
Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978); Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A
Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); John Kaplan,
Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968); Jonathan J.
Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the
Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247 (1990);
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999);
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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re-engages that debate from within manipulation law. It demonstrates both
the law’s current uses—often appropriate, and sometimes grudging—of
empirical methods of establishing the four elements commonly associated
with manipulation by providing an explication of the prominent uses of
these methods in important litigation. Particularly with regard to intent,
statistical and econometric methods are of greater importance to
establishing or discrediting a plaintiff’s case than many expect.
I. MANIPULATION BEFORE DODD-FRANK: INSUPERABLE
A. Definitions of Manipulation
The dysfunctional state of pre-Dodd Frank anti-manipulation law is
perhaps best reflected in the statutory, doctrinal, and scholarly confusion
concerning the concept of manipulation itself. Below we canvass this
muddled territory. The CEA makes it a felony “to manipulate or attempt to
manipulate the price of . . . any commodity . . . .”11 and creates a private
right of action to accompany the government’s civil and criminal
enforcement capabilities.12 Yet no statute, regulation, or case defines
manipulation for the purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act.13
According to Williams, “[t]he reason the Congress, the ABA, and the
courts have not crafted an all-encompassing definition of ‘manipulation’” is
because “[t]he concept is a constantly evolving one.”14 Others give a more
pessimistic diagnosis: want of a definition has left the law “a murky
miasma of questionable analysis and unclear effect.”15
11. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012).
12. Id. § 22(a); id. § 25(a)(1) (“Any person . . . who violates this chapter or who
willfully aids . . . a violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual damages resulting from
one or more of the transactions referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this
paragraph and caused by such violation . . . .”). It was not always clear that there would be
such a private right. See PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES
REGULATION 1462 (2d. ed. 1989).
13. See In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796, at 27,281 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (explaining that
“[n]either manipulation nor attempted manipulation is defined in the Commodity Exchange
Act. That task has fallen to case-by-case judicial development”); cf. Prohibition on Price
Manipulation, supra note 5, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41406-07 (“The Commission declines to adopt
comments proposing a new economics-based definition of manipulation. Instead, as stated
above, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered in determining whether a
violation of final Rule 180.1 exists.”); Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.)
(declining to define manipulation), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 654 (1933).
14. JEFFREY C. WILLIAMS, MANIPULATION ON TRIAL: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE
HUNT SILVER CASE xviii (1995).
15. 2 TIMOTHY J. SNIDER, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS
MARKETS 12.01, at 12-5 (2d ed. 1995); see also Edward T. McDermott, Defining
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With no determinative account, administrative and judicial opinions
offer a grab bag of accounts of manipulation. In In re Henner, the hearing
officer’s opinion stated that:
“Manipulation” is a vague term used in a wide and inclusive
manner, possessing varying shades of meaning, and almost
always conveying the idea of blame-worthiness deserving of
censure. There is usually also an implication of artificiality and
of skillful and ingenious management. In its most common use it
has reference to a speculator, or to a group of speculators who
buy or sell produce, in such a way as to give outsiders the
impression that such buying or selling is the result of natural
forces. Hence the term includes excessive speculation, the
spreading of false rumors, the working of syndicates to increase
or depress prices, “wash sales,” “matched orders,” and
“corners.”16
All of these notions—blameworthiness, artificiality, speculation, false
impressions and rumors, collusion to affect price, and specific practices—
are associated with manipulation, and each has held prominence in legal
theory and in the law at some point.
Scholars and observers have been encouraged to offer definitions, and
resulting interpretations of the state of the law, but the only ground of
agreement has proved to be the difficulty of proving manipulation. As one
scholar has put it, “Manipulation is difficult to define . . . . [D]rawing a line
between healthy economic behavior and that which is offensive has proved
to be too subjective and imprecise to produce an effective regulatory
tool.”17
A recurrent theme is the identification of manipulation with distorted
or unnatural prices.18 The former president of the New York Cotton
Exchange at Congressional hearings on cotton price fluctuations defined
manipulation as:

Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures “Squeeze,” 74 NW. U. L. REV.
202, 205 (1979) (calling manipulation law “an embarrassment—confusing, contradictory,
complex, and unsophisticated”).
16. 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (U.S.D.A. 1971).
17. Lower, supra note 1, at 392; Craig Pirrong, Squeezes, Corpses, and the AntiManipulation Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 17 REGULATION, no. 4, 1994 at
54 (“[T]o define just what manipulation means. . . . is a more difficult task than one might
think, because the term ‘manipulation’ is used very imprecisely and indiscriminately.”).
18. For artificiality in antitrust, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 223 (1940) (“[M]anipulation in its various manifestations is implicitly an artificial
stimulus applied to (or at times a brake on) market prices, a force which distorts those
prices, a factor which prevents the determination of those prices by free competition
alone.”).
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[A]ny and every operation or transaction or practice, the purpose
of which is not primarily to facilitate the movement of the
commodity at prices freely responsive to the forces of supply and
demand; but, on the contrary, is calculated to produce a price
distortion of any kind in any market either in itself or in its
relation to other markets.19
Likewise, Matthijs Nelemans has examined the connection between the
action and price pressure.20
Easterbrook is critical of efforts to find manipulation in artificial
prices:
An effort to isolate which “forces of supply and demand” are
“basic” and which are not is doomed to failure. What is a “basic”
demand? Economists think of supply and demand as givens.
People demand what they demand, and never mind the reasons
why. . . . There is no way to say what demand is real and what is
artificial.21
Against objective accounts,22 he proposes a subjective account that
emphasizes deceitful intent, a position several scholars share.23
Yet, there are problems with deceit-based accounts as well. It seems
that some manipulation comes not from deceit, but from some exercise of
market power. Pirrong and Russo both note that some manipulation
concerns “the elimination of effective price competition in a market for
cash commodities and/or futures contracts through the domination of
supply or demand, and the exercise of that domination to intentionally

19. Markham, supra note 1, at 312; see also Cotton Prices: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 70th Cong. 201-03 (1928)
(asserting that Marsh’s statement provides little guidance in defining manipulation); Wendy
Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 345, 360 (1987) (explaining that it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the
legislative history regarding the meaning of manipulation, and that Marsh’s statement offers
a “particularly unreliable reflection of congressional understanding”).
20. See Matthijs Nelemans, Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation, 42 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1169 (2008) (describing how manipulation is creating superfluous “price pressure”).
21. Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures
Markets, 59 J. BUS. S103, S117 (1986).
22. It should surprise no reader to find accounts that emphasize both artificiality and
intentions of the manipulator. See Christopher L. Gilbert, Manipulation of Metals Futures:
Lessons from Sumitomo 3 (London Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research, Discussion Paper No.
1537, 1997) (describing how manipulation can be best deterred).
23. See Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: The Misuse of Market Efficiency in Market
Manipulation Class Actions, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1135 (2011) (calling an attempt
to define manipulation to include profitable trading with bad intent “most thorough and
satisfying”).

VERSTEIN - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

REVOLUTION IN MANIPULATION LAW

3/3/2013 12:57 PM

365

produce artificially high or low prices.”24
Some scholars deemphasize intent, focusing on objective
characteristics of manipulation. Van Smith argues for a presumption of
manipulation where traders do not offset their contracts before delivery.25
Perdue offers conduct-oriented definition of manipulation “as conduct that
would be uneconomical or irrational, absent an effect on the market
price.”26 Friedman follows Perdue by comparing the trader’s act to his
behavior without manipulative intent. He does so by comparing the
behavior to “what the long [trader] would have done if he simply did not
take the anticipated impact into account,” and then, “what the long [trader]
would have done had he put out of mind the additional pressure created by
a system of punitive sanctions for default.”27
Of course, the more basic question is whether there is such a thing as
manipulation at all. Fischel and Ross believe “legal prohibitions are
unnecessary” in the futures markets.28 They claim that no objective test can
detect manipulation, and all subjective tests that find manipulation also find
fraud.29 As a result, there is no manipulation beyond what the law of fraud
can already address. They are skeptical as to the existence of whole
categories of putative manipulation, asserting that they are likely to be selfdeterring. The need to make prices rise through trading, but only after the
manipulator has acquired the commodity “creates an intractable dilemma
for the potential manipulator.”30 The trading behavior that drives up prices
for others drives up prices for the manipulator too, who must also face
transaction costs.
They further emphasize that manipulation requires deployment of
huge amounts of capital,31 that large positions are already largely prohibited
by law,32 and that exchanges have an incentive to prevent manipulation.33
With no gainful manipulation detectable that is not fraud, Fischel and Ross
24. 2 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON, Commodities Regulation § 5.03, at 238 (1982); Craig
Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence, 31 ENERGY
L.J. 1, 6 (2010).
25. M. Van Smith, Preventing the Manipulation of Commodity Futures Markets: To
Deliver or Not to Deliver?, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1605-06 (1981).
26. Perdue, supra note 19, at 348. Perdue also draws parallels to the antitrust concept
of predatory pricing. Id. at 394.
27. Richard D. Freidman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market
Manipulation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 30, 59 (1990).
28. Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in
Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 548 (1991).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 513.
31. Id. at 513.
32. Id. at 549.
33. Id.
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urge an end to the definitional and regulatory enterprise.
Fischel and Ross’s manipulation nihilism is not the end of the
discussion: Steve Thel responded that far more can alter price than fraud
and fictitious trades.34 For example, a broad category of contract-based
trades, such as executive compensation agreements, may be triggered by
changes in external prices. If the payoff from the contract is great enough,
it can be rational for a contractor to bid up the price of the asset.35 This
manipulation is plausible and does not seem to be fraud.
B. Common Types of Manipulation
If it is challenging to find scholarly consensus on the proper definition
of manipulation, it must suffice to define manipulation ostensibly, by
pointing out several examples that are broadly accepted as manipulation, if
only because the CEA does the same.
It specifically prohibits
“bucket[ing]” an order,36 “wash sale[s],” and “accommodation trade[s].”37
An effort to compile an exhaustive list of different manipulative schemes is
likely to be incomplete since “[t]he methods and techniques of
manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man.”38 That said, three
main categories of manipulation are broadly accepted:
delivery
impairment, false information, and market rigging.39
Delivery impairment includes cases that exploit disruptions in the
delivery mechanisms, often by dominating or interfering with the supply of
a cash commodity. Such manipulations are possible in commodities
markets because of the relationship between the “cash” or “spot” market
and the futures market. The cash market represents a purchase or sale of
the existing commodity, while the futures market represents a promise to
buy or sell in the future. Most futures contracts are cash settled, meaning
the commodity is never delivered—the contract owner agrees to accept the
value of the commodity instead. However, the contract owner, or “the
long,” usually has the right to demand physical delivery of the commodity,
forcing her counterparty to purchase the commodity on the cash market.
When the cash market is in some way impaired, and so delivery is
impracticable, “the short” will have few options but to accept unfavorable

34. Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 219 (1994).
35. Id.
36. 7 U.S.C. § 6B(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012).
37. Id. § 6C(a)(2)(A).
38. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971).
39. 2 THOMAS A. RUSSO, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURE AND OPTIONS
MARKETS § 12.11, at 12-18 (1983).
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terms of delivery or settlement. To make a stylized example, a short in the
oil futures market may promise to deliver ten barrels of oil in a year to the
long for $100 per barrel. That may seem like a fine deal if oil is currently
trading for $90 per barrel. The short expects to settle her contract either
with cash or by buying oil at the market price and then delivering it in
satisfaction of her contract. However, it may be that the long insists on
delivery at precisely the time that there are only five barrels for sale within
easy shipment of the point of delivery. The short is in a bind; to satisfy her
contract, she must contemplate transporting oil from far away at great cost.
With local delivery so impaired, she may be willing to pay the long an
attractive premium to satisfy her contract and, in any event, to pay a king’s
ransom for the five barrels that are available for delivery.
Squeezes and corners are two well-known delivery impairment
scenarios. A corner is a kind of manipulation in which someone, taking
advantage of the anonymity of futures trading, establishes a large [long]
futures position calling for delivery in a particular delivery month. Waiting
until those who have the contractual obligation for delivery have little time
remaining, the cornerer surprises them by appearing eager to stand for
delivery. Meanwhile, having obtained much of the deliverable grade
locally available, the manipulator leaves those committed to make delivery
the unenviable choice of paying express charges for transportation or
buying back the futures contracts at a premium.40
While in a corner, the trader has control of virtually all of the
available supply of the commodity underlying the futures contracts held by
the trader,41 in a squeeze a trader acquires a large futures position when
there is a shortage of the underlying commodity.42 A squeeze occurs in the
futures market alone, whereas a corner also involves manipulation in the

40. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 6; see also Gilbert, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that
“[t]he terms corner and squeeze tend to be used synonymously, but it is nevertheless useful
to follow Kyle (1984) in distinguishing between them. The crux of Kyle’s distinction is
whether the manipulator takes positions on the underlying physical market to create an
artificial shortage (a corner), usually in conjunction with futures market positions; or
whether he operates solely in the futures market but exploits the delivery mechanism to
distort the price of a particular future away from fundamental values (a squeeze). Squeezes,
he notes, are over once delivery is made, while corners tend to last longer”).
41. Markham, supra note 1, at 283.
42. Id. at 284 n.8 (“[A] squeeze may be intentionally created or it may result from a
natural shortage that traders seek to exploit. The latter event is frequently referred to as
‘congestion.’”) (citing REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ADMINISTRATION 40 (Sept. 25, 1939)). Further, a corner is unique in that the long party
must “bury the corpse” (sell off the commodity) afterwards without depressing prices and
rendering the corner unprofitable. Markham, supra note 1, at 294 (“[An] FTC study found
that congestion has price effects nearly as severe as a corner that is deliberately contrived to
squeeze the shorts.”).
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cash market.43 That is to say that a squeeze is possible where the
manipulator has taken no long or short positions in the underlying
commodity.
Delivery impairment strategies often require substantial amounts of
capital and staying power, as well as tolerance for risk. If delivery proves
easier than the manipulator guessed, then she may find herself receiving
large supplies for which she has no use, and without enjoying a substantial
price effect. For this reason, asymmetric information can be the
manipulator’s ally. A corner or squeeze is easier if the manipulator knows
that delivery is likely to be impaired at some point.44
The second category of manipulative conduct, the spreading of false
information, involves the indirect disruption of supply and demand by
creation of a state of misinformation in the market place. Large amounts of
buying or selling may sometimes send false signals to market participants
that they too should buy or sell, but this is an expensive and unreliable
technique.45 More common procedures are the dissemination of false
information or impressions through rumors or price reports, or “wash
sales”—transactions with one’s self or affiliates with no economic
substance. Such manipulation requires little to no capital and tends to be
relatively short-lived, as the market self-corrects.
The last type of manipulation, which we may call market rigging,
involves attempts by market professionals to tamper with the market by
virtue of their position within the system of trade. For example, prices
could be artificially high because brokers simply execute at an artificially
high price to the disservice of their clients. This type of manipulation
generally depends upon some or all of the following factors: lack of
market liquidity (however short-term), conspiracy or at least tacit
acceptance by a substantial number of market professionals, and some
defect in the future’s contract terms or some inefficiency in the cash market
such that delivery of cash commodity is not practical. We may also include
front-running, when a broker, having just received a large incoming
transaction, trades on his own account in order to profit from the effects of
a subsequent execution of the client order.
Many kinds of manipulation include elements from more than one of
these general manipulative strategies. For example, a delivery impairment
manipulation may be easier if one spreads false information about one’s
43. RUSSO, supra note 39, § 12-10.
44. Markham notes that Hedgers and Speculators are equally likely to engage in
manipulative trades as shown by the Ferruzzi soybean crisis. Markham, supra note 1, at
372; see also Craig Pirrong, Detecting Manipulation in Futures Markets: The Ferruzzi
Soybean Episode, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 28 (2004).
45. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 28, at 512.
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own position. Secrecy is important, as people know that it is dangerous to
promise to deliver wheat to someone who already owns most of the
deliverable wheat. If a trader did enter the contract by accident and found
out about supply conditions, she could bring new supplies to the market
(say, making arrangements for new wheat to be grown and delivered) to
reduce the premium she must pay to cancel her obligations. The
manipulator will profit most if he can keep the trader from realizing her
predicament.46
Another mixed strategy may be found in a short-squeeze, which aims
to depress prices to artificially low levels. In this instance, the manipulator
becomes the short in a number of future contracts and then places into
delivery a very large amount of the cash commodity. Not only does the
dump of cash commodity onto the market tend to depress the value of the
commodity, and therefore help the short contract, it also gives her an
opportunity to threaten to actually deliver the commodity in the future. A
large number of commodity traders may not actually want to own the
commodity; they may be pure speculators, or perhaps they are using the
commodity as a proxy for some other hedging purpose. For example, a
farmer, afraid that synthetic fertilizer costs may go up with energy prices,
could buy oil futures without actually wanting to receive oil. If she is
forced to take delivery, she is likely to sell the oil quickly. If the
manipulation is successful, a selling spree may be touched off by longs
rushing to liquidate or retender deliveries received at increasingly lower
prices.47 A short-squeeze may be difficult to carry out because it often
requires substantially more capital than long manipulations and is unaided
by development of natural conditions such as natural squeeze.48 A crucial
risk in the short squeeze is the possibility of large longs in the market with
the capacity to “stop” delivery (i.e., take delivery of the physical
commodity). If the short dumps cheap oil into the market, but someone is
ready to receive the oil, the short will lose substantially.
C. Legal Standard of Manipulation
For all that, the law has long prohibited manipulation. It is common to
say, with the CFTC, that four elements make up a CEA manipulation: (1) a
manipulative act or omission; (2) intent; (3) causation; and (4) artificial

46. Easterbrook, supra note 21, at S106.
47. In re Hohenberg Bros., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
20271, at 21477 (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977) (quoting THOMAS A. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF
FUTURES TRADING 309 (1971)).
48. RUSSO, supra note 39, §12-16.
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price.49 Commodities manipulation law has not looked to fraud or
deception directly, unlike the securities regime. Instead, this four-part test
focuses on market-power manipulation, typically the result of trading.
The legal and evidentiary standards for these elements are, in large
part, the subject of subsequent sections (other than manipulative acts,
which we considered, in part, above). It is common for investigations and
trials to concentrate on causation and artificiality of price together, on the
one hand, and intent on the other. This section elaborates the ways in
which these standards are implemented with an emphasis on the use of
econometric proof.
1. Price Artificiality and Causation
Price artificiality has been called the sine qua non of manipulation.50
An artificial price is one that does not “reflect basic forces of supply and
demand.”51 Where prices are artificial, they do not reflect all possible
market factors and create “conditions which prevent the futures market
from performing its basic economic function and hence [diminish] its
utility to those members of the trade and general public who rely on its
basic purposes.”52 But manipulations that fail to create an artificial price
have generally not been a concern since, “[i]t is generally considered that
none of [the evils of manipulation] occur absent distorted or artificial
prices.”53
Artificiality has been essential, in part, to focus enforcement where
harm has been done. The manipulator must have caused the artificial price,
but she need not be the singular cause of the artificial price: “It is enough,
for purposes of a finding of manipulation in violation of section 6(b) and 9
of the [A]ct, that respondents’ action contributed to the price
[movement].”54
49. In re Cox, [1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,786 at 34,061
(CFTC July 15, 1987); see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F.
Supp. 2d. 513, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); RUSSO, supra note 39, at §12-11. As pointed out
below, the respondent does not have to be culpable of the entire difference between artificial
and the market prices that would have prevailed under manipulation. In re Kosuga, 19
Agric. Dec. 603, 624 (U.S.D.A. 1960).
50. Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis
and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 956 (1994).
51. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), quoted in WILLIAMS,
supra note 14, at 6.
52. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1158.
53. RUSSO, supra note 39, at §12-22.
54. Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 483 (1953) (“[F]resh eggs
sell at a reasonably constant premium of considerable size over cash refrigerator eggs and
refrigerator futures, and that, generally, the prices of cash refrigerator eggs and refrigerators
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Although some scholars question the coherence of a notion of
“artificial price,”55 all agree that artificiality is not self-evident. Hence,
from the beginning, artificiality was in need of proof and courts have often
allowed use of econometric analysis. In Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, a classic
corner in the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in bushels of wheat, the
plaintiff’s expert proposed four tests for artificial prices characteristic of a
squeeze,56 three of which constitute an historical analysis of past price
movements57: (i) analyzing the allegedly artificial price movement in light
of price movements in the past nine years; (ii) comparing the spread
between the allegedly manipulated future and the next closest future and
comparing its movement to spreads over the previous nine years; (iii)
evaluating the exchange traded futures prices with equal futures on other
exchanges as compared to prior years; and (iv) determining the relationship
between the allegedly manipulated future close to delivery with cash
prices.58
The price artificiality inquiry need not be limited just to price trends:
The viability of manipulation often depends on the knowledge of market
participants and the structure of the market. Judge Easterbrook explains
the Court’s decision in finding Cargill liable for manipulation: “Cargill had
used its special knowledge to advantage—it profited not because it knew
more about the demand and supply of wheat in the cash market but because
it alone knew who owned the deliverable wheat in Chicago.”59
Judge Easterbrook goes on to point out the simultaneity of price spikes
futures will reflect precipitous drops in the prices of fresh eggs. This testimony was
corroborated by statistics dealing with these relative prices during the years 1932-1947.”).
Russo points out that the court neglected to subject the statistics to any significance tests.
RUSSO, supra note 39, § 12-26.
55. Easterbrook, supra note 21.
56. The CFTC in In re Indiana Farm Bureau overturned a prior court decision stating
that the “historical price comparisons of the type relied upon by the courts in Cargill and
G.H. Miller are of limited probative value here because of the unique combination of
circumstances which led to the price rise in the corn pit on July 20, 1973.” In re Indiana
Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
27,281 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982).
57. The same comparisons were also suggested in a FTC study of manipulation in the
grain market. 5 FTC, Report on the Grain Trade 27, 52 (1921). It is noted that “[t]he
existence of a corner may not, however, be completely revealed by this methodology
because other markets may reflect to some degree the effects of the corner.” Markham,
supra note 1, at 294.
58. If the futures market is functioning properly, at the close of trading in the futures,
the price of the futures will correspond closely to the price of the cash wheat that will satisfy
delivery (Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154). This concept is also known as the
convergence of the basis to zero upon expiration. See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES,
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 23, 75 (5th ed. 2003) (explaining the convergence phenomenon).
59. Easterbrook, supra note 21, at S119.
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and a large long open position does not necessarily constitute fraud and is
therefore not considered manipulation if other traders knew about the open
position. Similarly, Markham points to a Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) study where “it [is] noted that natural squeezes and corners
generally relate to the peculiarities of the futures markets rather than to
supply and demand conditions,”60 reinforcing the need for detailed
economic analysis on the but-for price to assist in the determination of an
artificial price, and on the possible causes of such effect. Indeed, Judge
Easterbrook suggests some of the analyses that an economist should
undertake when dealing with an alleged manipulation. He writes:
Someone searching for manipulation might look for asymmetric
information. He also might look for the telltale sign of sudden
price fluctuations. When the closing price on a futures contract
significantly diverges from the price of the cash commodity
immediately before and after, this is strong evidence that
someone has reduced the accuracy of the market price and
inflicted real economic loss on participants in the market. Courts
usually look for both concealment and sudden swings in price.61
In 1953, in Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan,62 the
court found manipulation on the grounds that egg futures prices did not
drop to a normal relationship with fresh eggs and other egg prices.63 The
court looked at three instances to show that prices had been manipulated
and were artificially high. First, the government showed that the supply of
refrigerated eggs in the allegedly manipulated December 1947 contract was
higher than it had been in two previous months as well as in December of
1946. It further showed that real demand, as opposed to technical demand
created by a cornering operation, was lower in December 1947 than in the
previous months. The court rejected the foregoing evidence stating that the
government failed to prove similar market conditions and prices in the
comparative months. Second, the plaintiff provided evidence of the
historical spread relationships between December and January futures at
the close of trading in the December futures during the years 1932-1948
(excluding some observations where price controls were in effect) and
compared it to the allegedly manipulated December 1947 futures. Third,
the court looked at the excessive premium of cash to futures eggs in light of
a historical constant premium that existed even during volatile price
episodes.64 In this case, proof that prices were manipulated or artificially
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Markham, supra note 1, at 294.
Easterbrook, supra note 21, at S118.
201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953).
Id. at 482-83.
Id.
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enhanced was perhaps the main issue in the entire proceeding.
In In re Compania Salvadorena de Café, collusive manipulation was
found when Salvadorena took delivery of about eighty-four percent of July
1977 coffee contracts. The Commission argued that objective measures
found that Salvadorena did not actually need cash coffee and compared
coffee prices to relevant benchmarks in similar coffee futures.65 The
administrative law judge concluded that an artificial price resulted from
these activities because the July contract prices exceeded the International
Coffee Organization indicator price for coffee of equivalent grade and
contemporaneous prices for the September 1977 contracts. As one of the
coauthors of this Article, Ms. Abrantes-Metz, has explained in a previous
paper:
In the silver manipulation episode of 1979-1980 by the Hunt
Brothers, nine economists (seven of which testified) prepared
reports on the silver market. Defense side experts opined on the
political and economic interpretation of the rise in prices, and
presented analyses on the prices in silver futures for distant
delivery dates as evidence that the price would have been high
with the Hunts trading. Evidence on price relationships,
comparing silver to other metals including gold and bullion to
coins was also presented on the defense side. A variety of tests
for price artificiality and causation were applied, for example by
comparing silver and gold prices and using “Granger-causality”
tests to determine whether the trading in silver had influenced
gold. The defendants used an econometric model to distinguish
the Hunts’ trading from other possible influences on silver by
relating the daily changes in their positions to the daily changes
in the prices of silver, and found no statistically significant effect
from the Hunts’ trading. They also presented correlations among
bullion price to show the geographic extent of the market and
introduced evidence on price relationships from several other
markets.66
The plaintiff’s economic experts presented statistical studies of silver
prices to comparisons of the Hunts’ futures position with bullion in

65. “Salvadorena had a policy of using the futures market to help support coffee prices
during at least 1976 and 1977 . . . . Salvadorena, the National Federation of Columbian
Coffee Growers, the Mexican Coffee Institute, and the Brazilian Coffee Institute had
contributed funds to support coffee prices.” In re Compania Salvadorena De Cafe, [19821984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,886 (CFTC 1983) (citation omitted).
66. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Defending Against Allegations of Fraud and
Manipulation: The Role of the Economist under the New CFTC Rules (Jan. 9, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1982302.
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exchange-approved vaults. Attention was also drawn to specific acts, such
as the deliverables taken, as evidence of manipulative intent. The
plaintiff’s experts analyzed the following indicators, which they argued
flagged manipulation: the silver/gold ratio, the coin/bullion differential, the
price spread with more distant delivery dates, and the variability of prices.
Williams presents a very detailed description of all of the economic
and empirical analyses performed, their advantages, and limitations.67
Economists presented analyses addressing all of the relevant four-part tests
of manipulation, and as Williams describes:
The two weeks that the economists spent before the jury
represented the lengthiest testimony except for that of the Hunts
themselves. The economist expert witnesses addressed all the
key aspects of any civil case, namely the nature of the offense,
the defendants’ intent to commit the offense, the causal
connection between the defendants’ actions and the damage to
the plaintiff, and the monetary valuation of that damage. The
economists spoke to the “ultimate issue”: Did the Hunts
manipulate the silver market?”68
At the end, Judge Morris E. Lasker had few doubts in determining that the
Hunts and their allies were the cause of the skyrocket pricing pattern
observed. Prior to the Hunt Brothers’ episode, it was thought that the silver
market was too large to be manipulated, but this decision showed that the
Hunts accomplished what previously had been thought to be not feasible.
Turning from silver to copper, Gilbert suggests that when searching
for manipulation “one may look for distortions in the futures price structure
(ie the term structure of futures prices) which are not explicable in terms of
seasonality.”69 Backwardation, defined as a negative value for the
difference between the futures price of a contract and the cash price for the
same commodity, has been identified as potentially indicative of
manipulation. Though backwardation can never be conclusive evidence of
manipulation, “if a market becomes abnormally prone to move into
backwardation, manipulation may be presumed.”70 Under backwardation,
there tends to be a high basis (structure) variability resulting in a poorer
67. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 100-60.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 6; see also RUSSO, supra note 39 § 12-23, (“Although the
maximum price difference for more distant months over nearby months is a virtual certainty,
the reverse is not always the case. When a severe shortage of deliverable commodities
exists, whether for natural reasons or because the market prices are being manipulated, the
arbitraging activities of commercial users described above are inhibited and the cash and
nearby futures trade at premiums over subsequent delivery months.”). Note that such a
convention only applies to non-perishable commodities.
70. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 7.

VERSTEIN - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

REVOLUTION IN MANIPULATION LAW

3/3/2013 12:57 PM

375

quality hedge. Of course, other circumstances could cause high volatility
in prices and consequent backwardation. It follows that if stocks (supplies)
are sufficiently available, backwardation would be unexpected. Gilbert
states that only under these circumstances would highly variable
backwardation be indicative of manipulation. Vice versa, “it is difficult to
distinguish attempted manipulations from successful speculation in a bull
market.”71
Gilbert uses the Sumitomo episode regarding an alleged manipulation
of copper in the 1990’s on the London Metal Exchange (LME) to conclude
that an observed stark backwardation in the futures term structure is
potentially indicative of manipulation.72 In the case of Sumitomo,
manipulation was alleged to have lasted for a period of over six years, and
the CFTC also alleged that backwardation was so extensive and longlasting on the LME that copper supplies moved from the COMEX
warehouse in Arizona to the LME warehouse in California.73 Furthermore,
the CFTC argued that arbitrage trading and other factors linked trading of
copper on the COMEX with that on the LME and Sumitomo’s activity
caused the upward manipulation of copper futures prices on the COMEX.74
Thus, distortion of prices can, under certain conditions, spread to other
markets or to other exchanges, which should be considered in a
comparative price analysis.
2. Intent
Although some scholars argue that the harms of manipulation are
sufficiently indicative of such behavior that they warrant remedy even
absent a demonstrated intention to manipulate,75 it is clear that
manipulation liability is never incurred unintentionally.76 Importantly,
manipulation does not occur by simply trading in a manner that affects the
price. The scienter requirement articulated in In re Indiana Farm Bureau
makes clear that more is required: “the intent requirement, which is the
same for a manipulation and an attempted manipulation, is ‘the
performance of an act or conduct which was intended to effect an artificial

71. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 9.
72. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 7-10.
73. In re Sumitomo Corp., CFTC Docket No. 98-14 (CFTC May 11, 1998).
74. Id. at *18.
75. For examples of such arguments, see Pirrong, supra note 50; Fischel & Ross, supra
note 28.
76. See Markham, supra note 1, at 284 (observing that “the government and the courts
have engrafted an intent requirement onto the prohibition against manipulation, requiring a
showing that the trader intended to create an artificial price”).
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price.’”77 That is, scienter in manipulation law is intent as to the artificial
price element. The Cargill court concluded that “[t]he aim must be . . . to
discover whether conduct has been intentionally engaged in which has
resulted in a price which does not reflect basic forces of supply and
demand.”78
A requirement of intention is important because it is widely believed
that some arrangements with manipulative effects can occur by accident.
For example, a market actor may buy a quantity of futures as well as the
underlying commodity, and then the supply of the underlying commodity
may decline for unrelated reasons. She would find herself with a right to
demand delivery from counterparties while, quite innocently, she owns
much of the existing stock of the commodity. The law regards this
accidental corner quite differently from one that the trader intentionally
effected. In Great Western Food Distributors v. Brannan,79 which
concerned manipulation of the market price of refrigerated eggs, the court
declared that “the intent of the parties during their trading is a
determinative element of a punishable corner” and unintentional corners
should not carry the same penalties.80 Similarly, in Volkart Brothers v.
Freeman, the Fifth Circuit, considering a squeeze in the New Orleans
Cotton Exchange, recognized that squeezes may be mere congestions and
thus, it must be proven “that [the respondents] intentionally brought about
the squeeze by planned action.”81 If intent were not required, many
accidental transactions would be subject to liability.82
Although specific intent is required under the CEA, courts have
allowed proof by way of circumstantial evidence or by showing that the
defendant had both the motive and the opportunity, as with securities fraud
law.83 Objective econometric analysis therefore plays an important role in
establishing subjective state of mind. For example, the Cargill court,
considering unusual trading patterns at the end of a trading day, found that
Cargill’s “behavior in liquidating its contracts was clearly intentional and

77. [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796, 27,282 (CFTC
Dec 17, 1982) (citation omitted).
78. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971).
79. 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953).
80. Id. at 479.
81. Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962).
82. See Markham, supra note 1, at 320 (“[T]he term manipulation means more than the
charging of what someone may consider to be an unreasonably high price. . . . A squeeze
not planned or intentionally brought about by a trader would not be actionable under the
Commodity Exchange Act.”).
83. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1167-70. Such inference of intent is in agreement with
Perdue’s definition of manipulation “as conduct that would be uneconomical or irrational,
absent an effect on market price.” Perdue, supra note 19, at 348.
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was highly unusual market behavior; and the method of liquidating the
unresolved open interest following the close of trading was also unusual
and clearly controlled by Cargill.”84 Intent was the best explanation for
unusual behavior.
Courts will sometimes infer that actions taken contrary to apparent
commercial interest are indicative of intention to manipulate. The notion
of commercial interest was also addressed in In re Sumitomo, where traders
for Sumitomo “acquired and maintained a dominant and controlling
position in both the physical supply of deliverable LME warehouse stocks
and in maturing LME futures positions.”85 The CFTC inferred that “[t]hese
positions were not intended to meet Sumitomo’s legitimate commercial
needs,” but rather “[t]he intent motivating the acquisition and control of
both the cash market positions and the futures market positions was
expressly to create artificially high absolute prices and artificially high and
distorted premium of nearby prices over futures prices.”86 Further, “[a]s
the Commission has observed, when a price is affected by a factor which is
not legitimate, the resulting price is necessarily artificial.”87
Circumstantial proof of intention may include profit motive;88 tying up
delivery and/or transportation facilities;89 establishment of substantial
futures and cash positions and subsequent disposition of those positions,
particularly if not consonant with ordinary commercial behavior;90 use of
step-up orders;91 and payment of prices in excess of fair market value.92
This is typically combined with appropriate analysis to exclude legitimate
reasons for such actions, which is both a key legal dimension of
manipulation law and one in dire need of economic analysis to be properly
conducted. Finally, Russo observes that a long who takes advantage of a
natural squeeze in supply “by standing for delivery can rightfully be said to
have intended the natural and foreseeable consequences of his or her act.”93
In such a case, a passive investor, upon learning of the squeezed market
84. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1170-71.
85. In re Sumitomo Corp., CFTC Docket No. 98-14, at *17 (CFTC May 11, 1998).
86. Id.
87. Id. at *18.
88. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971); In re Hohenberg Brothers,
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20271, (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977); In
re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982).
89. As alleged by plaintiffs in Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 290 (2d Cir. 1980);
RUSSO, supra note 39, §12-20.
90. Cargill, 452 F.2d 1154.
91. Id.
92. In re Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1232-39 (U.S.D.A. 1971); see also RUSSO,
supra note 39, §12-20.
93. RUSSO, supra note 39, §12-34.
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conditions and deciding to act on this knowledge, becomes an active
manipulator.
D. Manipulation is Hard to Prove
Over the last several decades, the CFTC has not successfully
prosecuted a meaningful number of manipulation cases.94 Many agree that
its lack of success in litigation has been due in great part to the fact that in
order to establish manipulation, the CFTC was required to prove the intent
to create an artificial price, that prices were in fact artificial, and that they
were caused by the alleged manipulator. As one scholar has noted:
[U]nder present law the crime of manipulation is virtually
unprosecutable, and remedies for those injured by price
manipulation are difficult to obtain. Moreover, even where a
prosecution is successful, the investigation and effort necessary
to bring a case will involve years of work, enormous
expenditures, as well as an extended trial.95
The difficulty of proving manipulation as a conceptual matter has been
discussed above, but its practical difficulties are best illustrated by the
financial market’s most shocking contemporary manipulation—Libor.
1. Libor
Libor has been called “the world’s most important number,”96 and it
dominates the interest-rate swap market97and syndicated loan market,98 and

94. Dissatisfaction with the CFTC has been noted by members of Congress and in case
law. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Improvements Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 707, 102nd
Cong. 212 (1991); 135 CONG. REC. H5603, H5613 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Long) (“I feel that we should do all that we can to ensure that the CFTC play a more
active role in regulating the exchanges . . . .”); Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade
of Chi., 977 F.2d 1147, 1166 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he amendment was motivated in large part
by dissatisfaction with the Commission’s failure to take vigorous action in this very
case. . . . A separate provision in both bills further reflects Congress’ view that the
Commission’s supervision has been less than adequate.”).
95. Markham, supra note 1, at 281; Pirrong, supra note 17, at 60 (“The reasoning in
several cases makes it virtually impossible to meet any of these three standards, let alone all
three simultaneously.”).
96. See sources cited supra note 7.
97. Dennis Kuo, David Skeie & James Vickery, A Comparison of Libor to Other
Measures of Bank Borrowing Costs (June 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/vickery/LiborKSV_staff_webpage.pdf.
98. Xanthe Lok, Libor and Market Disruption: The Future of Libor, 23
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 421, 421 (2008).
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powerfully influences residential and commercial mortgages.99 The British
Banker’s Association (BBA)’s website states that Libor is the primary
benchmark for short-term interest rates globally, and is used as the basis for
settlement of interest rate contracts on many of the world’s major futures
and options exchanges. At least an estimated $350 trillion worth of
contracts reference Libor.100
Early in 2011, it became public that the U.S. Department of Justice,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the CFTC, the Japanese
FTC, the European Commission and other regulatory agencies101 had
started investigating the possibility of a conspiracy between traders and
treasury departments of several major banks aimed at manipulating Libor
in various currency denominations between at least 2006 to at least 2008.
In June of 2012, Barclays detailed how its traders had attempted to
manipulate Libor since at least 2005,102 for which Barclays paid a
settlement of $450 million—then the largest fine ever levied by the U.S.
and U.K. regulators.103 In addition to these governmental investigations,
there is significant private litigation activity currently in its initial stages.
During the period of time corresponding to the allegations, Libor
operated by way of sixteen banks submitting sealed daily quotes, and the
“middle 8” quotes (in terms of value) being converted into the Libor
through a simple arithmetic mean calculation. The Libor quotes are
submitted by an employee of each of the contributor banks, just before 11

99. Justin T. Wong, Libor Left in Limbo: A Call for More Reform, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 365, 365 (2009) (stating that Libor is the reference rate for $900 billion in subprime
mortgages); Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Laurence Norman & James Hagerty, LIBOR’s
Rise May Sock Many Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008, at B1.
100. Kuo et al, supra note 97; The Basics, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com
/bbalibor-explained/the-basics (“bbalibor . . . is written into standard derivative and loan
documentation such as the ISDA terms, and is used for an increasing range of retail products
such as mortgages and college loans. . . . It is the basis for settlement of interest rate
contracts on many of the world’s major futures and options exchanges.”).
101. See, e.g., Lindsay Fordado & Joshua Gallu, Libor Probe Said to Expose Collusion,
Lack of Internal Controls, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2012-02-15/libor-investigation-said-to-expose-collusion-lack-of-internalcontrols.html.
102. Non-Prosecution Agreement, Appendix A, Statement of Facts (June 26, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9312012710173426365941.pdf.
103. Lindsay Fortado & Silla Brush, Barclays Fined by U.K., U.S. for Falsifying Libor
Rates, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0627/barclays-said-to-be-nearing-libor-settlement-with-fsa-cftc.html. Since that time, UBS
paid about $1.5 billion, and Royal Bank of Scotland paid about $600 million. Danielle
Douglas, Royal Bank of Scotland to Pay $612 million to Resolve Libor Case, WASH. POST,
Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/rbs-to-pay-612m-toresolve-libor-case/2013/02/06/2c0cc42c-6fd3-11e2-aa58-243de81040ba_story.html?wprss=
rss_business.

VERSTEIN - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

380

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/3/2013 12:57 PM

[Vol. 15:2

a.m. each day, in response to the following question: “At what rate could
you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting
inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?”104 The
quotes are supposed to reflect the rate at which large banks can borrow
unsecured funds from other banks. On a daily basis, after all quotes are
submitted and the Libor is computed, all of this information (including all
individual quotes) is made public.
The alleged manipulation concerns the submission of knowingly
inaccurate Libor quotes by the panel banks. If several banks submit figures
that do not closely match their actual borrowing costs in the interbank
market, then the aggregate Libor is probably affected.
Three theories are often discussed with respect to the alleged motive
of the banks in this matter. The first is a reputational theory, according to
which several of the panel banks artificially depressed the price of Libor by
submitting falsely low quotes, in order to preserve their reputations during
the early days of the financial crisis. Submitting a quote to the BBA that
showed a very high borrowing cost in the interbank market might indicate
that the market is unsure of that bank’s creditworthiness, which could result
in worsening financing prospects. No bank wanted to be the next Lehman
Brothers or Bear Stearns, so each had an incentive to lowball their Libor
quote. Libor itself would consequentially end up too low.
The reputational theory seems to be the most well-known, having been
the subject of the Wall Street Journal article that brought the possibility of a
Libor disruption to public attention,105 but plaintiffs in the various lawsuits
generally rely on a different theory. They posit that the panel banks were
motivated by a desire to extort wealth from their customers. This
extractive theory points to the fact that a disruption in the Libor would
result in large wealth transfers, benefiting or harming anyone who had a
non-zero net exposure to Libor. If Libor were artificially lowered, those
who owed money on loans written to Libor would owe less to their lenders
than before. Contracts that are settled in terms of Libor would be lower in
value. For example, the CME Eurodollar futures contract settlement price
is defined as one hundred minus Libor,106 so that a four percentile drop in
Libor would result in a four percentile drop in settlement value to the
purchaser.
The panel banks borrow or lend at Libor, and they may take positions
in the Eurodollar contract market, but the most important means of

104. The Basics, BBA LIBOR, supra note 100.
105. Mollenkamp, Libor Fog, supra note 7.
106. Eurodollar Futures, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interestrates/stir/eurodollar_contract_specifications.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
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extraction would have been by way of interest rate swaps. Interest rate
swaps are a massive market approaching $450 trillion dollars in notional
value,107 in which the fourteen largest dealers are a party to eighty-two
percent of the transactions by value. Libor panel banks are among the
largest swap dealers in the world.108
Interest rate swaps allow corporations, commercial banks, and other
entities to manage their interest rate risk. For example, the City of
Baltimore has entered into many swaps in which it pays a fixed rate and
receives Libor. One 2003 swap has the city paying 4.97% to their
counterparty and receiving the one-month Libor rate.109 This $17 million
swap makes the city better off when interest rates rise, which is intended to
help the city cope with its floating rate bonds, which become more
expensive as interest rates rise.
In a typical interest rate swap, one party pays a fixed amount and the
other pays an amount linked to a varying rate such as Libor. Generally,
derivatives dealers will try to have something like a balanced position,
offering a floating rate in one contract and receiving a floating rate in
another. That way they are not caught off-guard by the vagaries of interest
rate changes. Yet, by intentional trading or by accident, imbalances in
position can occur. And if a bank were to be a Libor payer more than a
Libor receiver, it would benefit from Libor’s decline. In the case of the
City of Baltimore, a decline in the Libor rate would reduce Baltimore’s
payment from its counterparty while its fixed-rate obligation remained
constant.110 If Baltimore’s counterparty had no other Libor exposure, it
would have accrued wealth from the manipulation. The extraction theory,
offered by the plaintiffs of In re Libor,111 as well as the economists Youle
and Snider,112 holds that banks offered false Libor quotes in order to exploit
the fact that they had robust net positions on Libor.
A final theory is related to the extraction theory, but it does not

107. ISDA Market Survey, ISDA.ORG (2009), http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDAMarket-Survey-historical-data.pdf.
108. Participants in the Mid-Year 2010 ISDA Market Survey, ISDA.ORG,
http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/Participants-MY10.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (listing
the 71 banks that contribute to the ISDA survey).
109. CITY OF BALTIMORE, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT YEAR ENDED
JUNE 30, 2009, at 58 (March 31, 2010).
110. If Baltimore’s bonds are all linked to Libor as well, then the city may not net a loss
or gain, but its bondholders would lose from a lower Libor.
111. In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11-MD-2262, 2011 WL
5980198 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011).
112. Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the Libor Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs?
(Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~youle001/
libor_4_01_10.pdf.
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imagine long-term and large positions on a bank’s balance sheet. Rather,
the trading theory suggests that a bank may have engaged in trading that
was informed by their knowledge of future Libor changes, or that they may
have changed Libor to benefit short term trading positions. This theory is
closer to ordinary insider trading. No vocal proponent has endorsed this
view, though it does fit the tone of allegations against a recently dismissed
trader from the Royal Bank of Scotland’s Singapore office. Tan Chi Min
alleges in his wrongful termination suit that it was common practice for
senior bank employees to request that RBS seek to influence the Libor rate
to profit their own positions as well as those of the banks.113 One could
imagine traders treating Libor as their secret weapon to make sure that
Eurodollar futures trades work out well more often than they should.
This last example underscores an important point:
If any
manipulation occurred, it may or may not have had institutional approval.
Tan claims that it was RBS’s practice to influence the Libor, but his
employer claims that Tan was fired for improperly influencing Libor on his
own initiative. On any theory, a manipulation might have been perpetrated
by a rogue trader or executive rather than with the full approval of the
board of directors.
Nonetheless, even the lone wolf theory in which a trader acts alone
calls into question a bank’s internal controls. Regulators in Japan recently
sanctioned Citigroup and UBS because their employees attempted to
improperly, and repeatedly, influence the Tibor (the Tokyo equivalent of
the Libor).114
The Japanese Securities and Exchange Surveillance
Commission said that the banks lacked internal controls to prevent rate
manipulation.115 Barclays’ non-prosecution agreement included lurid
descriptions of traders and rate-setters, sitting nearby one another or cozily
agreeing to cooperate.116 The FSA’s subsequent investigation concluded
that “[t]here are weaknesses in governance arrangements for the
compilation process, and within contributing banks themselves.”117
The result of potential manipulation could be monumental. Consider

113. 2nd UPDATE: Ex-RBS Singapore Trader Sues Bank For Wrongful Dismissal,
WSJ.COM (Jan. 12, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120112709529.html; see also Caroline Binham et al., Brokers Suspended in Libor Inquiry, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A1.
114. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Calls for Action Against Citigroup and UBS, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Dec. 9, 2011, 7:29 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/japan-callsfor-action-on-citigroup-and-ubs.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 102.
117. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 75 (HM Treasury, UK Sept. 28,
2012); see also id. at 81 (explaining how Barclays failed to have adequate risk management
or controls).
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Libor’s impact on real estate. One study by the Federal Reserve of
Cleveland found that if the six-month Libor hovered 1.75% higher than
historical averages would predict, as it did in early 2008, then the average
subprime borrower would pay an additional $100 per month, per $100,000
of remaining debt118 Thus, a modest manipulation upward in Libor could
easily extract $1000-2000 per year from a typical subprime borrower.
Regressive by any standard, this would increase mortgage defaults at a time
when they already pose systemic risk concerns. Individual wealth transfers
can lead to inefficient capital allocation and systemic risks:
A lower Libor induces a lower mortgage rate, makes it easier to
buy homes, substituting homes away for other goods. This
artificially inflates the prices of homes . . . while deflating the
prices of other goods. The immediate implications of a nonmarket determined Libor, over a prolonged period of time, have
the potential to lead to bubbles and meltdowns of the type we are
currently experiencing.119
A manipulated Libor would affect wealth transfers and misallocate
capital. The index would also eventually lose respectability in the
marketplace, which would be a tragedy. The Association of Corporate
Treasurers, once a critic of the banks alleged to have manipulated Libor,120
recently issued a statement of appreciation for the Libor banks.121 Though
potentially victims of any manipulation, corporate borrowers enjoy having
a lingua franca for borrower rates, and would be genuinely harmed if Libor
lost widespread credibility.122
We discuss in a later section some of the means used to screen for
potential manipulation and conspiracy in this market. The immediately
following section goes on to show the challenges that would be expected in
bringing a suit against the panel banks under pre-Dodd-Frank manipulation
law even if the allegations were true. If the Libor disruption represented
manipulation, the pre-Dodd-Frank CEA would be ill-equipped to remedy
the manipulation.
118. Mark Schweitzer & Guhan Venkatu, Adjustable-Rate Mortgages and the Libor
Surprise, tbl. 5 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentar
y/2009/012109.pdf?WT.oss=libor&WT.oss_r=147.
119. Rosa Abrantes-Metz et al., Tracking the Libor Rate, 18 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS
893, 897-99 (2011).
120. Press Release, Ass’n of Corp. Treasurers, Loan Agreement Market Disruption
Clauses to be Invoked only as a Last Resort (Sept. 28, 2008),
http://www.treasurers.org/marketdisruption/pressrelease.
121. Press Release, Ass’n of Corp. Treasurers, ACT Stresses the Importance of Libor
and EURIBOR to companies, (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.treasurers.org/node/7329.
122. Author’s conversation with John Grout, Policy & Technical Director, Association
of Corporate Treasurers (Nov. 9, 2011).
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1. Problems of Proof
Before Dodd-Frank, manipulation law required proof of price
artificiality and the defendant’s intention. These are difficult elements to
prove, and they are particularly difficult with a financial instrumentality
like Libor. Below, we apply these elements to Libor with a focus on the
role of economic analysis.
a) Artificiality
Notwithstanding the longstanding use of empirical investigation in
manipulation cases, described in I.C., supra, adjudicators have sometimes
tied their hands by being hostile to econometric means of proving
artificiality.123
Indiana Farm Bureau provides a particularly clear
example.124 Although a 30% price jump on the last day of corn trading was
enough to persuade two Commissioners of price manipulation, the majority
dismissed the use of cash-futures price comparisons.125 The result has been
a very high standard of proof with very little means of realistically attaining
it.126 However, some scholars have concurred in skepticism about the
possibility of inferring artificiality from a benchmark of comparable
prices.127
These problems become vastly more difficult when confronting
interest rates rather than eggs. If 30% price jumps in eggs are unimportant
to a court, then some very profitable manipulations will fly below the
court’s radar.
One reason concerns scale. For many commodity and swap
transactions, the profits reaped from manipulation could be great even
when the relative scale of manipulation is small. The notional value
indexed to Libor approaches $400 trillion. A tiny change in Libor produces
123. See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 50 (examining existing decisions which have
restricted the use of econometric means in proving manipulation).
124. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982).
125. Id. ¶¶ 27,286-87; accord In re Cox, [1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 23,786 at 34,064 (CFTC July 15, 1987) (“[T]he prospective behavior of a ‘normal’
market is not necessarily bounded by the market’s historical experiences.”).
126. See Pirrong, supra note 50, at 959 (explaining that “current precedents make it
extremely difficult to find a trader guilty of manipulation even in cases in which the
economic analysis suggests that the trader has indeed manipulated”).
127. See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 12, at 1262 (“It seems fair to say that no two
futures contracts behave identically, and even when similar futures exist, they may be
occasioned by quite different market conditions or judgments.”); Lower, supra note 1, at
394-96; McDermott, supra note 15; Perdue, supra note 19, at 373-80; Van Smith, supra
note 25.
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simply massive transfers of wealth. For example, some have suggested that
Libor was manipulated by about thirty basis points.128 If Libor were to
move down thirty basis points, or 0.3%, Libor payers in aggregate would
see their liabilities drop by more than $1 trillion per year. If large banks
were net payers on Libor, a great deal of this would inure to their benefit.
If, for example, a bank were a payer of Libor on 10% of the world’s
interest rate swaps by value, and a payee of Libor on 9% of the world’s
interest rate swaps, their net exposure would be 1% of the world’s notional
value, or $4 trillion. Paying 0.3% less on that $4 trillion exposure would
make the bank’s share of the misallocation exceed $10 billion annually,
which is a very attractive return that could be caused by a relatively small
manipulation. These back-of-the-envelope estimates are within the
ballpark of the banks’ own guesses. Citi in 2009 reported that it would
make $936 in net interest revenue if interest rates dropped twenty-five basis
points per quarter for one year.129 These gradual changes are a fraction of
the magnitude of the sudden price changes disregarded in Indiana Farm
Bureau. An extractive manipulation could be vastly profitable and yet
within the realm of statistical error, and well below the threshold a court
might demand.
The relative profits could be even greater on a trading theory. If a
trader could consistently guess the tiny movements in Libor, or cause them
in advance of a trade, then each trade could be marginally more profitable.
With many trades per day, a bank’s proprietary trading desk could leverage
an insight of three basis points into millions of dollars in a day.130
Courts cannot assume that a manipulation large enough to tempt
manipulators will also be large enough for demonstration in court. Indeed,
profitable manipulations may be so small that they are difficult to detect at
all. Once discovered, it may be hard to show that a small change in the
price was not the result of chance or some other cause; therefore,
materiality of the alleged behavior may be difficult to establish. Unless
reliable means can be used to find and locate the causes of true changes in
the price of a swap or commodity, detection and proof will be rare and
spotty.
b) Intent is Hard to Prove
For a plaintiff alleging manipulation, proving the defendants’ intent
128. See Mollenkamp, Libor Fog, supra note 7 (reporting that an analyst at Citi
suggested that Libor was thirty basis points too low).
129. Citi Form Y-9C.
130. This activity could be aided by fast-trading hedge funds. See Binham et al., supra
note 113 (noting that hedge funds “place big bets on movements in [Libor] rates”).
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entails clearing many hurdles. Intent is a subjective state, which is not
always readily demonstrable. While courts accept circumstantial evidence
of intent from behavior, that behavior is often explicable without any
intent, bedeviling the demonstration of the requisite scienter. If the
investor has legitimate reasons for taking an action, then no manipulative
intent can be concluded.131 As the judicial officer noted in In re Kosuga,
“[d]rawing a line between legitimate trading and trading with manipulative
intent is sometimes a very difficult task.”132 Since a small manipulation can
still have a big impact, the trade or quote will not be far from what others
would expect anyway.
It is always difficult to litigate mental states, but the legal burdens of
demonstrating intent are exacerbated by certain features of financial law
and financial markets because these industries promote the evaporation of
typical forms of evidence of scienter. The Supreme Court has noted that
“banking is a highly regulated industry,”133 and the more highly regulated
an industry, and the more claims that are brought against participants in it,
the likelier they are to avoid the sort of (electronic) paper trail to which
plaintiffs have traditionally turned in seeking evidence of intent. For
example, financial professionals now know that when matters become
sufficiently problematic, they should call one another—on their personal
cell phones—making smoking gun e-mails increasingly rare.
The In re Libor defendants may have left some documentary evidence
if traders and brokers collaborated.134 The BBA excludes the top and
bottom quartile of bank quotes, so that if any individual bank provides a
“too low” or a “too high” Libor quote, it will be excluded by the
determining group and hence will not directly influence the Libor. Yet

131. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (“In the absence of evidence that
respondents were responsible for the market congestion, it cannot be inferred that
respondents’ trading activity, consistent with their hedging program and commercial
commitments, was intended to produce an artificial price. Standing for delivery as they did
was respondents’ contractual right and was motivated by the pre-existing commercial needs
and the uncertainty of price in the inactive cash market. Unlike Cargill, Indiana Farm
Bureau did not deplete the local cash commodity late in the delivery month; did not
establish a large long speculative position at a time it knew it held virtually all of the cash
commodity; and did not increase its long position on the last day of trading. Nor did it
liquidate a dominant speculative long position at prices already seven to eight cents over the
market.”).
132. 19 Agric. Dec. 603, 615 (U.S.D.A. 1960).
133. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
134. Affidavit of Brian Elliott in Support of an Ex Parte Application for Orders to
Produce Records Pursuant to Section 11 of the Competition Act and for Sealing Orders,
Canadian In re Libor investigation, at 11, (May 18, 2011) (“The Alleged Offences were
carried out through e-mails and Bloomberg instant messages . . . .”).
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manipulation remains possible. Collusion, which might have left evidence
of intent, would have made Libor manipulation far easier. A collusive
arrangement of at least five banks would certainly affect the Libor. For
example, if the five banks provide “too low” quotes, lower than all other
banks, the bottom four will be excluded, but the fifth from the bottom will
be included and will manipulate the Libor downwards. If a manipulative
cartel forms, as investigators become increasingly convinced occurred, it
becomes likely that evidence of their coordination can be found to
corroborate intent.
Yet, the levels of collusion required to manipulate Libor are lower
than it may seem. Under some circumstances, a single individual can
unilaterally affect the Libor rate.135 Although outlier quotes are excluded, a
bank that moves the included middle of the pack closer to the outer quartile
may affect the average, and any bank that arrives in the excluded outer
quartile may push in another quote that would have previously been
excluded; even banks excluded from the computation of Libor can affect it
through false submissions, since it may cause other bank quotes which
would not have belonged to the group of eight quotes entering in the Libor
computation to be counted. This is the indirect way in which even
excluded banks may be able to affect Libor.136 Thus, all banks in the panel
may unilaterally affect the average by moving the quote in at least one
direction.137 Collusion would make the scheme much easier, but even small
collusive arrangements could have a meaningful impact for the conspiring
parties. Perhaps this is why government investigators have focused on
small conspiracies, often a request from a trader at a bank to a colleague
working for a voice broker, rather than industry-wide cartels.138 When
manipulation can occur by the cooperation of just a few individuals within

135. Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and
Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 101 (2013) (explaining how a single bank
can manipulate the Libor rate).
136. To make this clear, consider an example with four banks: A, B, C, and D. They
submit quotes of 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. At the start, A and D are the outlier quotes and
excluded. B and C are included and their average is 2½. At this point, any bank but A can
lower the quote. If B submits ½ instead of 2, then B is excluded but A becomes included.
The average of A and C is 2, which is lower than 2½. If C submits ½, then the included set
includes A and B, with average 1½. If D submits ½ then the included set is A and B, with
average 1½. Only A cannot unilaterally lower the Libor rate. See Rauterberg & Verstein,
supra note 135, at 133-34 (analyzing manipulation mechanics)
137. In fact, fewer than 50% of the bank quotes are excluded because banks with quotes
that tie the middle 50% are included. Thus, from January 2, 2007 until August 8, 2007, 95%
of panel quotes were included in the average. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor
Manipulation?, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 136 (2012). During that period, 95% of the time, a
bank could influence the Libor total by changing its quote.
138. See, e.g., Order for the Production of Records, Canadian In re Libor, June 9, 2011.
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a bank, the challenge of proving intent through documentary evidence
grows.
The challenges in commodities partially parallel those under securities
fraud law. In securities litigation, a private plaintiff is required to show the
defendant acted with scienter, “a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.”139
Not only is intent required to prove
manipulation, but also the threshold for demonstrating intent, even at a
motion to dismiss stage, is extremely demanding. As the Supreme Court
has put it, “[e]xacting pleading requirements are among the control
measures Congress included in the PSLRA [Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act]. The [Act] requires plaintiffs to state with particularity . . . the
facts evidencing scienter, i.e., the defendant’s intention . . . .”140 This
includes, under the PSLRA, that plaintiffs establish “with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.”141 In Tellabs, the Supreme Court clarified what a strong
inference is, stating that “[t]o qualify as ‘strong’ within the intendment of
§ 21D(b)(2) . . . an inference of scienter must be more than merely
plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as
any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”142 The law thus
establishes unusually challenging evidentiary burdens for the
demonstration of intent in two primary contexts of financial manipulation:
securities and commodities transactions.
3. Problems of Scope
Problems of proof are by now familiar.
Many profitable
manipulations were hard to prove under the CEA, including—if it
occurred—Libor manipulation. More importantly, the CEA simply did not
purport to cover many transactions that were of great importance. For
example, if Libor were manipulated, its greatest impact would be felt in the
massive interest rate swap market. Despite frequent efforts by the CFTC to
assert jurisdiction,143 the Congress amended the CEA to be clear that it did
139. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (holding that an implied private cause
of action exists under the Commodities Exchange Act).
140. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007). See
generally Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) (analyzing law governing
intent in pre-Tellabs, but post-PSLRA era).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
142. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504-05.
143. See Louis Vitale, Comment, Interest Rate Swaps Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 539, 541-43 (2001) (describing CFTC’s efforts to regulate
interest rate swaps).
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not cover Over-the-Counter (OTC) interest rate swaps between
sophisticated parties.144 In the pre-Dodd-Frank days when much of the
Libor manipulation is alleged to have taken place,145 Libor-related swaps
would not have been eligible for redress under the CEA.
CEA manipulation might still be alleged for exchange-traded
derivatives, such as Eurodollar future contracts, but CEA manipulation law
was unequipped to remedy such manipulation, even if it were adequately
proved. One reason is that the specific intent element is not simply an
evidentiary problem of how to show that a defendant intended to create an
artificial price. It is a legal standard that actually excuses manipulations
where the defendant recklessly created an artificial price while intentionally
engaging in some other opprobrious conduct, but did not specifically intend
to create the artificial price.
Consider the reputation account of Libor manipulation, in which
banks are alleged to have submitted false Libor quotes for no reason other
than protecting their reputation.146 The quote submitter may not be
attempting to injure any particular party. She may not intend to affect the
price of a commodity or security. That is a byproduct, barely considered,
of her desire to protect the bank’s reputation. She may think that her quote
will be an outlier from the pack and so excluded from the average and have
negligible impact on the Libor rate. Similarly, even if her quote is likely to
influence Libor, and so the values of many assets and positions, including
those of her firm, she may not have given any thought to the relationship
between Libor and those other assets. Her exclusive concern with firm
reputation may be reckless, to be sure, but may lack specific intent to cause
an artificial price for a swap or commodity.
To go further, the quote submitter may not even know that the quote is
false. Libor is quoted in several currencies and tenors per day. In addition
to popular tenors like the U.S. Dollar (USD) three-month Libor, it also
includes surveys of seven-month Swedish Krona borrowings. Each day the
bank is to provide its unsecured rate for borrowing Swedish Krona for
seven months in London. Yet the bank may not have borrowed any
Swedish Krona in that duration in London that day,147 and the BBA rules
144. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 103, 114
Stat. 2763, 2763A-377-78 (excluding contracts in excluded commodities between eligible
contract participants); id. § 101 (adding interest rate to the definition of excluded
commodity).
145. Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 8.
146. See, e.g., Robert Barr, Barclays CEO: Market Fixes Were for Protection,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 29, 2012, available at: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/barclays-ceomarket-fixes-were-protection (discussing the reputation theory).
147. The Basics, BBA LIBOR, supra note 100 (“Bbalibor is not necessarily based on
actual transactions, as not all banks will require funds in marketable size each day in each of
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disallow the bank to simply take a USD rate and apply a foreign exchange
conversion to it.148 The BBA asks for data the banks do not really have.
The bank must devise some process to answer the question and that process
may be good or bad, forthright or opportunistic, but intentionally false and
manipulative would be harder to say. This is not just a problem for obscure
currencies.
The most important Libor to swap and loan participants is
undoubtedly the three-month Libor. It is the basis of the majority of
subprime mortgages, among other assets.149 Yet banks borrow very little at
the three-month duration any more. Seventy percent of interbank
transactions are overnight, and ninety-five percent are for one month or
less.150 Thus the world’s most important benchmark is set from some of the
thinnest markets. In the context of thin trading, it is harder for treasurers to
report patently false quotes and easier for them to recklessly allow a quote
that happens to be helpful to the bank. The problems created by thin
markets are not unique to particular currencies or tenors. Suppose a bank
gets a cheap loan from the government at a subsidized rate, or a loan from a
creditor hoping to protect the borrower’s reputation. Should the treasurer
include this unusual loan in its assessment of the day’s borrowing costs?
BBA can help to clarify these issues,151 but until it does, there is ambiguity
about what counts as the bank’s borrowing cost. A treasurer that interprets
ambiguity in whichever way benefits her bank may be reckless with the
truth, but it is hard to say that there is a specific intent to manipulate.
Even if intentionally misleading quotes were offered with the
knowledge that they could affect artificial commodity prices, it is not clear
that they would fit under the CEA intention element. The CEA does not
require a profit motive for the manipulation.152 Nor need the manipulator

the currencies/ maturities they quote and so it would not be feasible to create a full suite of
LIBOR rates if this was a requirement.”).
148. Definitions, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/definitions
(last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
149. Guhan Venkatu, How Many U.S. Mortgages are Linked to Libor?, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF CLEVELAND (July 10, 2012), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2012/0
712/01banfin.cfm.
150. EUR. CENT. BANK, EURO MONEY MARKET SURVEY (2007) (noting that seventy
percent of transactions are overnight, and ninety-five percent are less than one month).
151. McKenzie, supra note 7; see also author’s conversation with John Ewan, Director
of BBA Libor (explaining that the unusual loan could be integrated into the submission).
152. See CFTC v. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“We do not
agree . . . that a ‘profit motive’ or a ‘demonstrated capability of realizing manipulation’ are
necessary elements of a manipulation or an attempted manipulation claim.”) (citation
omitted). Note that this would cover even pro-public interest manipulation. Perhaps this is
why Hazen includes government and regulatory actions in his chapter on manipulation.
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 12, at 1292-93.
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even hope to profit at her counterparty’s expense.153 But it is essential that
the defendant have actually intended to manipulate the commodity, rather
than trying to manipulate some other item while having reason to know that
both prices would be affected. For example, in one case from the Southern
District of New York, a plaintiff alleged that manipulations of the Treasury
notes market were affecting their positions in Treasury bill and Eurodollar
future markets. These markets are intimately related, and it might seem
reasonable that if the defendant had intended to manipulate treasury notes,
she might have intended also to manipulate Treasury bills and Eurodollar
futures. The court found that no claim was stated because Treasury notes
were not underlying either Eurodollar futures markets or Treasury bill
futures.154 It is not difficult to imagine a court finding that if a given bank
intended to manipulate Libor, it did not necessarily intend to manipulate
Eurodollar futures. The specificity of intent can surprisingly narrow the
scope of the CEA.
II. MANIPULATION AFTER DODD-FRANK: UNFINISHED
In the aftermath of the largest global financial crisis since the Great
Depression, and in the face of ongoing financial scandals discussed earlier
in this Article, the CFTC adopted new anti-manipulation rules of potent
generality and breadth. In this Part, subpart (A), we overview the new
statutory law and regulations and analyze their legal implications. Subpart
(B) shows that the new rules may be read as responsive to many of the
concerns in Part I. The standards of proof and scope have been adjusted to
cover more potential manipulations, including the alleged Libor
manipulation. But that does not end the discussion. Subpart (C) shows the
changes to CEA manipulation law must be taken to precipitate a change in
the technology used in consideration of manipulation. Although it may
seem that Dodd-Frank and its implementing regulations reduce the need for
complex empirical analysis because it eases the challenge of showing
specific intent and artificiality, in fact the legal system must become more
attentive to econometric techniques than ever. This is in part because of
the factors that Dodd-Frank and the new rules do not address: initial
detection, establishing damages causation and recklessness, and pleading
standards. Each of these items remains the subject of intense empirical
interest, to a degree only highlighted by the new rules. Changing the

153. See Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petrol., 666 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (stating that defendant oil company alleged to have suppressed the price of oil in
order to qualify for favorable UK tax laws).
154. Three Crown Ltd. P’ship v. Caxton Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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elements of the manipulation offense does not by itself end the difficult
inquiries that frustrated manipulation before: Complicated factual analyses
will still be necessary to detect and plead manipulation, as well as to
establish damages. Without empirical support the law will either be
toothless or else excessive. Though the new rules address many of the
difficulties with the CEA’s manipulation regime, the reforms are
unfinished if they are implemented through rules alone. They require
thorough empirical analysis by courts and parties.
A. Explication of Law
The authority for the CFTC’s new anti-manipulation regulations is
section 753 of Dodd-Frank, which amends section 6(c) of the Commodity
Exchange Act.155 Three amendments and their implementing rules are
consequential here. First, section 6(c)(3) extends traditional market power
manipulation prohibitions to cover swaps, and clarifies that intent will
suffice where the manipulation was unsuccessful: “It shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate
the price of any swap, or of any commodity . . . .”156 Final Rule 180.2
implements the provision: “[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any swap,
or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any registered entity.”157 The Commission has
expressed its intent to continue to be guided by the four-part test for pricemanipulation arising under the previous CEA section 6(c) and CEA section
9(a)(2). As previously explained, based on Russo and extensive case law,
the four components are: (1) the accused had the ability to influence
market prices and (2) the intent to create or affect prices not reflecting
legitimate forces of supply and demand; (3) artificial prices existed and (4)
the accused caused such artificial prices.158 For attempted manipulation
cases, there are only two requisites: the intent and an overt act in
furtherance of that intent. Thus, section 6(c)(3) modestly bolsters attempt
liability and brings swaps into the market power manipulation regime.
The other two amendments create, for the first time, a fraud-based
manipulation scheme under the CEA, and in so doing import vast case law
from the federal securities regime. Section 6(c)(1) now declares that: “It
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, or

155.
156.
157.
158.

7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 15 (2012).
Id. § 9(3).
17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2012)
RUSSO, supra note 39, § 12.11.
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attempt to use or employ, in connection with any swap, or a contract of sale
of any commodity . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance.”159 Section 6(c)(1)(A) extends the scope of section 6(c)’s
primary prohibition, including within the reach of unlawful manipulation,
delivering “a false or misleading or inaccurate report concerning . . . market
information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any
commodity . . . knowing, or acting in reckless disregard of the fact that
such report is false, misleading or inaccurate.”160 In other words, it focuses
on manipulation effected through false reporting.
Rule 180.1 implements these amendments.161 It prohibits fraud and
fraud-based manipulation as well as attempted fraud or manipulation by
any person, acting intentionally or recklessly, directly or indirectly, in
connection with any swap, cash, or futures contract. Examples of conduct
forbidden under rule 180.1 include:
Us[ing] or employ[ing], or attempt[ing] to use or employ, any
manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
Mak[ing], or attempt[ing] to make, any untrue or misleading
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made not untrue or
misleading;
Engag[ing], or attempt[ing] to engage, in any act, practice, or
course of business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person . . .
[Knowingly or recklessly] deliver[ing] or caus[ing] to be
delivered . . . by any means of communication . . . a false or
misleading or inaccurate report concerning crop or market
information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of
any commodity . . . .162
This new rule differs from pre-Dodd-Frank rules in five important
ways. First, it extends to swaps. Second, in contrast with pre-Dodd-Frank
cases, in which the Commission had to establish that the fraud was in
connection with a swap or cash or futures contract made, or to be made for,
on behalf of, or with the victim of the fraud, rule 180.1 contains no similar
limitation. Third, while the new law allows trading on nonpublic market
information obtained in the usual course of business, material nonpublic
market information obtained through fraud or deception or in the breach of
a pre-existing duty may not be used unless disclosed. This brings an
insider trading rule akin to the securities regime’s misappropriation theory
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. § 9(1).
Id. § 9(1)(A).
17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2012).
Id.
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to commodities and swaps.
Fourth, rule 180.1 relaxes two key elements of manipulation claims:
artificiality and intention. It expands the scienter standard to include
reckless behavior, which may be sufficient by itself without the specific
intent to defraud or manipulate.
Finally, it is evident from the statutory language (and the language of
the final regulations themselves), that the anti-manipulation rules import
the language, and hence, presumably the case law of securities fraud under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) and SEC Rule
10b-5, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.163 The legal implications of the
180.1 anti-manipulation rules are vast, and it is clear from the language and
scope of the regulations that their drafters intended to have the kind of
impact on the trading of commodities that Rule 10b-5 has had on the
securities markets.164
It may even go further: Section 6(c) encompasses attempt, unlike
section 10b of the SEA, and lacks Rule 10b-5’s requirement of a purchase
or sale. The implications of these rules are enormous, but our focus is on
their interaction with cases of complex potential financial manipulation.
Depending on the species of manipulation, sections 180.1(a)(1), (2), (4)
and section 180.2 are all pertinent.
B. Application to In re Libor
The new provisions seem responsive to some of the challenges for
pre-Dodd-Frank manipulation law, and so provide a means to address
alleged Libor manipulation. With rule 180.2, CFTC intends to extend its
four-element price manipulation standard into this new rule, subjecting
swaps for the first time to this liability scheme.165 Much of the Libordependent market includes exchange-traded and OTC swaps. The new
rules clearly bring these into the fold.
Rule 180.2 also covers attempted manipulations. This may prove
essential to covering cases where the manipulation was ineffective, and so
did not create an artificial price. For an example from the alleged Libor
163. Comments of Daniel Arthur, Romkaew P. Broehm, & Gary Taylor regarding
Proposed Rules 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 and 180.2, at 2, http://www.brattle.com/_documents/Uplo
adLibrary/Upload905.pdf.
164. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative
and Deceptive Devices, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,410 (July 14, 2011) (statement of Chairman
Gary Gensler) (“This rule implements new Dodd-Frank authorities to police against fraud
and fraud-based manipulative schemes, based upon similar authority that the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Federal Trade
Commission have for securities and certain energy commodities.”).
165. Id. at 41,407-08.
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manipulation, a bank that is already in the excluded quartile might submit a
false quote that is even further into the excluded quartile in an attempt to
influence the Libor rate. This attempt would be unsuccessful since the rate
would not change as a result of this quote. However, the activity is the type
of conduct that many would agree should be proscribed. The attempt prong
may be essential to prosecuting a panel bank whose quotes fall outside the
mean-shaping quotes for the critical period and thus, arguably, is not part
of the eight quotes that shape the mean and generate Libor’s value. The
rules also specifically contemplate attempt liability for an employee who
orders a subordinate to make a fraudulent misstatement, but has that order
rebuffed.166 They thus promote robust internal controls.
The Commission’s authority is extended with respect to pre-Dodd
Frank rules through its prohibition of manipulation and attempted
manipulation that is either direct or indirect. It expects to exercise its
authority “where the fraud or manipulation has the potential to affect cash
commodity futures, or swaps markets or participants in these markets.”167
Rule 180.1 creates new types of manipulation liability with largely
different standards. The key inclusion of “recklessly” in the section 180.1
definition of scienter is thought to substantially ease the specific intent
requirement. The Commission defines recklessness as “an act or omission
that ‘departs so far from the standards of ordinary care that it is very
difficult to believe the actor was not aware of what he or she was
doing.’”168
This certainly eases the burden of proving manipulation. Although
intent can be proved by external evidence, it is a subjective state. On the
other hand, recklessness is fundamentally a standard of conduct that
requires judgments about what information an actor should have had and
what results she should have anticipated, regardless of whether she in fact
acquired that information or intended any particular result.
More interestingly, a recklessness standard seems to capture many of
the hitherto elusive manipulations that might have occurred in the Libor
disruption. For example, the reputation theory has it that Libor is
manipulated as an indirect result of the direct and specific desire to provide
a submission quote that protects the banks’ reputation. Artificial prices in
loans, swaps, and Eurodollar futures are a more indirect result still. It is not
clear that a trader who did not think at all about those results would have
had the specific intent requirement for CEA manipulation under the pre-

166. Id. at 41,403.
167. Id. at 41,401 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 41,404 (quoting Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).
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Dodd-Frank rules. Now, it is clear that she would be eligible for reckless
liability. Even if she did not want or know about those other price effects,
it is very difficult to believe that she was not aware of what she was doing,
and of course she departed far from an ordinary standard of care.
Recall also that many tenors of Libor are thinly traded and so provide
the bank officer little evidence either way on what the appropriate Libor
quote should be. Here, it is hard to establish specific manipulative intent
because the officer can hardly be said to have offered a quote that she
knows to be false. If there were no loans at all made at that tenor, and there
have been none in a while, how can a particular number be assuredly
incorrect? Rather, she is simply being reckless by offering a quote that she
has no good reason to think true, and it would seem to fall below a standard
of ordinary care to give a quote that is not the fruit of a diligent
information-gathering process. Similarly, suppose a bank determined that
it would use a different methodology every day to determine its Libor
quote, selecting whichever yields the lowest quote. It is unlikely that this
calculation method amounts to a specific intentional manipulation as such,
but it probably yields reckless quotes.
The new rules also bring CEA enforcement to areas of overlap
between the Commodities Exchange Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and
Antitrust laws. Many times, violations of the CEA are also violations of
the SEA or of the Sherman Act. For example, security-based swaps are
under the jurisdiction of both the SEC and the CFTC. Similarly, some
manipulative or fraudulent schemes may cover a variety of security and
commodity assets. Some defendants may already be liable under the SEA.
Yet allowing claims under the CEA that parallel the SEA is not mere
superfluity because the CEA authorizes a wider range of defendants than
does the SEA.
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A.,169 the Supreme Court limited liability under section 10(b) of the SEA
and rule 10b-5 to only “primary” perpetrators of fraud.170 The Court ruled
that there is no private right of action against secondary actors such as
lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants who may have facilitated the
fraud but did not personally make a false or misleading claim. 171
Subsequent decisions have only confirmed the SEA’s focus on primary
actors.172 By contrast, the CEA explicitly grants a private right of action
169. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
170. Id. at 191.
171. Id.
172. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158
(2008) (limiting “scheme” liability for secondary actors who have not made a false or
misleading public statement or otherwise obtained a duty to disclose); see also James C.
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against secondary actors.173 Thus, where an activity violates both the SEA
and the CEA, such as a fraud that concerned both swaps and securities or of
security-based-swaps where the CFTC and SEC have overlapping
jurisdiction, secondary actors who are not liable under the SEA may still be
subject to suit under the CEA. The arrival of CEA manipulation to the
realm of swaps and security-based swaps increases the degree of vicarious
liability.
With rules implementing Dodd-Frank’s anti-manipulation provisions,
the U.S. is now a leader in both civil and criminal enforcement capacity for
manipulation of financial indices and benchmarks, with regulators around
the world taking the Libor disruption as an opportunity to decide whether
they too should implement rules akin to Dodd-Frank’s.174
C. The Dangers of Dodd-Frank: Market Manipulation and
Intervention
It may seem that these new regulations solve problems and reduce the
need for expert economic analysis in adjudication. Yet, they require
empirical support to strengthen and temper their potential.
The other side of powerful rules is the dangers of overdeterrence and
mistargeted prosecution. Rule 180.1 suits predicated on recklessness allow
plaintiffs to avoid the marked difficulties of demonstrating intent or
artificiality.
The downside of this elimination, however, is that
recklessness opens the door to the prosecution of innocent (though
complicated) economic behavior. This is particularly important at the
pleading stage, where it may appear that vastly more plaintiffs will be able
to survive a motion for summary judgment even where their claims are
baseless. The new rules underline the importance of well-employed
Dugan & Todd G. Cosenza, The Future of Secondary Actor Liability Under Rule 10(b)-5
After Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS.
793, 793 (2009) (“[I]t was widely believed that [Stoneridge] limited the ability of securities
class action plaintiffs to bring claims against secondary actors, such as lawyers, accountants,
and investment bankers, who did not themselves make any false or misleading
statements.”).
173. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (2012) (“Any person (other than a registered entity or registered
futures association) who violates this chapter or who willfully aids, abets, counsels, induces,
or procures the commission of a violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual
damages . . . .”) (emphasis added).
174. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 117, at 11 (urging greater enforcement powers
for FSA); Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Transcript
of Oral Remarks Before European Parliament, Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee,
Brussels Belgium (Sept. 24, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@n
ewsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/opagensler-121.pdf (urging provisions similar to
U.S. enforcement authority).
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economic analyses as an essential boundary to the new rules.175 If
economic tools can act as a buffer against the new rules, filtering out
claims that implicate benign but complex swap transactions, it can lower
the costs and reduce the fears of law-abiding swap market participants.
III. PROPOSAL: ECONOMETRIC SCREENS
The new rules establish lower burdens in manipulation trials, while
not altering the actual difficulty of detecting manipulation, the difficulties
of proving causation and damages, or the importance of crafting an
appropriate pleading standard. This section describes some of the issues
left unanswered by the new law, and alludes to the econometric
technologies that are needed to supplement the new law. It describes
screening methodologies for detecting, proving, and dismissing alleged
manipulation. We describe examples of these three uses based on the
professional experiences of one of the authors.
A. Screens for Detection
Regardless of how Dodd-Frank and its implemented rules adjusted the
elements of manipulation, no claims will be brought if manipulation is not
itself detected. The art of flagging potential unlawful behavior through
economic and statistical analyses is commonly known as screening.176 A
screen is a statistical test based on an econometric model and a theory of
the alleged illegal behavior, designed to identify whether manipulation,
collusion, fraud or cheating of any kind may exist in a particular market.
Screens use commonly available data such as prices, bids, quotes, spreads,

175. See Robert S. Bloink, Does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Rein In Credit
Default Swaps? An EU Comparative Analysis, 89 NEB. L. REV. 587, 608-12 (2011)
(questioning whether Dodd-Frank’s reforms went far enough in managing the risks
associated with certain bespoke derivatives).
176. For surveys of screening methodologies, their multiple applications, and how to
properly develop and implement a screen, see Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Libor Litigation and the
Role of Screening: The Need for Enhanced Compliance Programs, COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., July 2011 [hereinafter Abrantes-Metz, Role of Screening]; Rosa
Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and their Multiple Applications,
24 ANTITRUST 66 (2009) [hereinafter Abrantes-Metz & Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies];
Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple
Applications Extended, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129 (2010) [hereinafter Abrantes-Metz
& Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies Extended]; Joseph Harrington, Detecting Cartels, in
HANDBOOK IN ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008). Additionally, in the
context of detecting conspiracies, screens can be successfully used as detailed in A.B.A.
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, ch.
VIII (2010).
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market shares, or volumes to identify patterns that are anomalous or highly
improbable.
Broadly speaking, the literature identifies two primary screening
strategies. The first is to search for improbable events. This type of screen
is similar to looking for a “cheat” in a casino. For example, the probability
that a gambler at a Las Vegas casino will place a winning bet in roulette on
black or red is 47.37%. During a shift, a roulette dealer may see a handful
of players win five, or even seven, times in a row. However, the
probability of winning twenty times in a row is around one in a million. If
a pit boss observes such an occurrence, he may not be able to prove that
cheating has occurred, yet he would be well advised to watch the winner
closely to avoid the risk of losing a significant amount of money. One set
of collusive screens generalizes this idea by searching for events that are,
under normal conditions, improbable, unless agents in a market are
cheating.
The second type of screen uses a control group. As an example,
during the 1980s, one study found that the price of concrete was seventy
percent higher in New York City than in other U.S. cities. While it is true
that the prices of many goods and services are somewhat higher in New
York City, relatively few of those prices are seventy percent higher than in
other large cities. It was later established that an organized crime syndicate
in New York City had been operating a concrete club that rigged bids on
contracts over $2 million. Prices that are anomalous, compared to other
markets, suggest a lack of competition.
This section continues by describing (1) the use of screens in
government investigations, and (2) the use of screens in detecting
anomalies in Libor data.
1. Government Detection
Antitrust law has long been receptive to economic analyses, both in
terms of governmental regulation and judicial decision-making. This
section seeks to give a quick recapitulation of these features in order to
illuminate how commodities manipulation could similarly benefit. To
begin with, seminal Supreme Court decisions have often cited economics
literature as support for the directions that antitrust law takes.177 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has warned against not conferring evidentiary weight on

177. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
233 (1993) (citing economic analyses as support for claim that “[s]upracompetitive pricing
entails a restriction in output”).
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sound economic analyses.178
Economic analysis and empirical screening have had great success in
triggering antitrust cases, including actions against an Italian cartel in the
baby milk industry and a Dutch cartel in the shrimp industry. Screens have
also been used successfully to identify potential anti-competitive behavior
in gasoline markets by the Federal Trade Commission, and to prioritize
complaints in the Brazilian gasoline retail market, leading to raids and the
discovery of dispositive evidence.179 In Mexico, the competition authority
has initially flagged a conspiracy in pharmaceutical markets through the
use of bid-rigging screens, while in India screens were applied to detect a
cement cartel.180 Competition authorities worldwide are using empirical
screens to detect anti-competitive behavior, including the FTC, the
European Commission, and competition authorities in The Netherlands,
Austria, Italy, Turkey, Hungary, Brazil, Mexico, India, and South Africa.181
Two different examples can illustrate the power of screens to detect
anti-competitive behavior in financial markets. One is the recent stock
options backdating and spring loading cases from the mid-2000’s and the
other is the 1994 break of an alleged conspiracy by NASDAQ dealers in
which odd-eighths quotes were avoided.182 Both of these were triggered by
the application of screens to financial data and generated large size
investigations as well as private litigation.
178. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962) (explaining that
“[i]n such cases, it becomes necessary to undertake an examination of various economic and
historical factors in order to determine whether the arrangement under review is of the type
Congress sought to proscribe”).
179. M.R. Venkatesh, Of Cement, Cartels and Corruption, REDIFF INDIA ABROAD (Jan.
17, 2008), http://www.rediff.com/money/2008/jan/17cartel.htm.
180. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FIGHTING BID RIGGING IN PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT IN MEXICO (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/abuseof
dominanceandmonopolisation/49390114.pdf.
181. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Screens for Conspiracies and their Multiple Applications,
(A.B.A. Brown Bag Series “Beyond Leniency: Empirical Methods of Cartel Detection”),
Dec. 15, 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/2
0111215_at1215_materials.authcheckdam.pdf; Abrantes-Metz & Bajari, Screens for
Conspiracies Extended, supra note 176; Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 119. It is also
increasingly important and recognized to be important that derivatives regulators cooperate
internationally.
See, e.g., Brooksley Born, International Regulatory Responses to
Derivative Crises: The Role of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 21 NW. J.
INT’L. L. & BUS. 607, 609-10 (2001) (“Recognizing that ‘derivatives markets serving United
States industry are increasingly global in scope’ and that ‘events that disrupt financial
markets and economies are often global in scope, require rapid regulatory response, and
coordinated regulatory effort across international jurisdictions,’ Congress expressed its view
that the CFTC should ‘continue to coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities, to
participate in international regulatory organizations and forums . . . .’”).
182. Rosa Abrantes-Metz, The Power of Screens to Trigger Investigations, 7:10 SEC.
LITIG. REP. 17 (2010).
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The CFTC monitors trading and prices to screen for candidates that
may warrant a closer look to detect potential illegal behavior. The
Commission’s monitoring and screening program uses several sources of
market information. Some data are publicly available, such as data on
overall supply, demand, and marketing of the underlying commodity; also
futures, options and cash prices, and trading volume. Other information
may be highly confidential, and that includes data from exchanges,
intermediaries, and large traders. As exchanges report daily positions and
transactions of each clearing member to the Commission, those data may
be analyzed as part of the screening effort. The data separately show
proprietary and customer accounts and the aggregate position and trading
volume of each clearing member in each futures and option contract.
These can be used to quickly identify the firms clearing the largest buy or
sell volumes or holding the biggest positions in a particular market, though
beneficial owners of the positions are not identifiable in these clearing data.
As explained by the CFTC:
[The] market surveillance program is intended to preserve the
economic functions of U.S. futures and option markets under its
jurisdiction by monitoring trading activity:
 to detect and prevent manipulation or abusive practices,
 to keep the Commission informed of significant market
developments,
 to enforce Commission and exchange speculative position
limits, and
 to ensure compliance with Commission reporting requirements.
The market surveillance program’s primary mission is to identify
situations that could pose a threat of manipulation and to initiate
appropriate preventive actions. Each day, for all active futures
and option contract markets, the CFTC’s market surveillance
staff monitors the daily activities of large traders, key price
relationships, and relevant supply and demand factors in a
continuous review for potential market problems.183
Price aberrations in the cash market for an underlying financial
instrument may provide an opportunity for an attempted manipulation.
CFTC staff monitors cash prices of the financial instrument specified for
delivery on the futures contract in relation to cash prices for nondeliverable instruments that are close, or identical substitutes, noting that
when deliverable prices are high relative to non-deliverable prices for
183. CFTC Market Surveillance Program, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/MarketSurveillance/CFTCMarketSurveilla
nceProgram/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
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financial instruments, it may flag the possibility to remove deliverable
supplies from the futures market as part of an attempted manipulation.184
Additionally, the Commission explains that another flag for manipulative
activity is when market participants take positions well beyond their
financial capacity to take delivery or make settlement. The CFTC explains
that it maintains open lines of communication with the Treasury
Department, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the SEC and other
agencies, since several financial products involve US Treasury or agency
instruments (e.g., bonds or notes).
With respect to cash-settled markets, the CFTC explains that its focus
is on the integrity of the cash price series used to settle the futures contract.
The size of a trader’s position at the expiration of a cash-settled futures
contract cannot affect the price of that contract because the trader cannot
demand or make delivery of the underlying commodity.
Since
manipulation of the cash market can yield a profit in the futures contract,
the CFTC monitors large reportable futures positions and is alert for
unusual cash market activity on the part of large futures traders, which is
particularly important during the time in which final cash price for futures
settlement is determined.
2. Non-Government Detection
It is not only governments that can use screens to detect manipulation.
This section describes a recent use of screens by one of co-authors of this
piece and two other scholars (Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz and Seow
(2008)), which flagged a possible conspiracy and manipulation of the U.S.
Dollar London Interbank Offered Rate (“Libor”).185 The results of this
study, and preliminary evidence previously put forward by the Wall Street
Journal, warranted a closer look at the data. Presently, government
regulators,186 scholars,187 trade associations,188 and private litigants189 have

184. Id.
185. Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 137.
186. See, e.g., Joseph Palazzolo, Jean Eaglesham & Carrick Mollenkamp, U.S. Asks if
Banks Colluded on Libor, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2011, at C1 (stating that “U.S. investigators
are examining whether some of the world’s biggest banks colluded to manipulate a key
interest rate before and during the financial crisis, affecting trillions of dollars in loans and
derivatives. . . .”); see also Donald Griffin, Citi Penalty Sought in Japanese Tibor Probe,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 8, 2011, available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-1209/citigroup-penalty-sought-in-japanese-tibor-probe-nikkei-says.html (discussing Japanese
regulators’ investigation of whether Citigroup pressured banks to submit interest rate quotes
to manipulate the Japanese index interest rate in its favor); Brooke Masters, Patrick Jenkins
& Justin Baer, Big Banks Investigated Over Libor, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2011 (last updated
Mar. 15, 2011, 10:24 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab563882-4f08-11e0-9c25-
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all developed a keen interest in understanding whether Libor acted
atypically during the crisis, and whether, if it did, this was the result of
human manipulation. Initial interest in the potential manipulation of Libor
is the result of screen application. Not only did this screen help to raise
initial concerns as to Libor disruption; it also directed subsequent inquiries
as to which periods of time most warrant additional scrutiny.
The design of the study was as follows: Abrantes-Metz and
colleagues compared the one month Libor and the four month Libor—the
rate at which large London banks purport to be able to borrow on an
unsecured basis for one and three months at a time—to the Federal Funds
Effective rates. The authors present the results for the one-month Libor
and explain that they are qualitatively identical for the three-month Libor.
These rates should not be identical. The Federal Funds Effective rate
represents overnight loans from one depository institution to another.
However, given the short-term, unsecured nature of the loans, it would be
intuitive for them to exhibit some relationship. Similarly, when AbrantesMetz and her colleages compare Libor to the one-month Treasury rate, it
would be unsurprising if some historic relationship existed. Libor may be a
higher rate than the Treasury rate because it exposes lenders to the risk of a
bank’s default rather than that of the United States itself, presumably a
higher risk,190 but both include the cost of borrowing money. For them to
wildly diverge for no reason would be cause for some subsequent inquiry.
Abrantes-Metz and her colleagues determined the typical spread
between Libor and these other rates going back to 1990 and then compared
it to the spreads during recent months. The Figure below, extracted from
Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz and Seow (2008), represents the one month
U.S. dollar Libor from January 2007 through May 2008, plotted against
two comparable rates, the Federal Funds Effective rate and the one month
Treasury-bill.
00144feab49a.html#axzz2JVE4kS00.
187. Snider & Youle, supra note 112; Jacob Gyntelberg & Philip Wooldridge, Interbank
Rate Fixings During the Recent Turmoil, BIS Q. Rev., March 2008, at 59; Connan Snider &
Thomas Youle, Diagnosing the LIBOR: Strategic Manipulation and Member Portfolio
Positions (Working Paper 2009), available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~bajari/undergrad
iosp10/LiborManipulation.pdf.
188. Press Release, Ass’n of Corp. Treasurers, supra note 120. But see ACT Stresses
the Importance of LIBOR and EURIBOR to Companies, ASS’N OF CORP. TREASURERS,
http://www.treasurers.org/node/7329 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (showing appreciation for
LIBOR and EURIBOR).
189. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 135, at *58 (analyzing litigation claims).
190. But see, e.g., Richard Wolff, Q&A: What If U.S. Defaults on Debt?,
USATODAY.COM (last updated July 15, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/washington/2011-07-14-what-deficit-fight-means_n.htm (addressing the possibility of
the United States defaulting on its debt in the wake of the 2011 debt ceiling crisis).
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FIGURE 1

(Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz and Seow (2008 & 2012))
Several interesting observations can be made from this graph and the
associated data. First, the Libor rate seems to move through distinct phases
between the start of 2007 and the middle of 2008. Superficially, the Libor
rate appears to be essentially constant for the first 8 months of 2007 before
it begins to fluctuate rapidly. Abrantes-Metz and her colleagues find the
Libor quotes during that period suspicious. They also confirmed a
suspicious breakdown between banks’ individual Libor quotes and their
own CDS spreads. Banks that reported lower borrowing costs than their
peers in terms of their Libor (implying relative stability) were often more
expensive to insure in the CDS market (implying a lack of stability).191
Other empirical studies followed by Snider and Youle192 and AbrantesMetz and her colleagues.193 These studies employ additional screens to flag
certain anomalous patterns in the Libor data.

191. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor Manipulation?, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 136,
147 (2012).
192. Snider & Youle, supra note 187; Snider & Youle, supra note 112.
193. Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 119. In many data sets, the distribution of digits
has a natural, regularly occurring pattern. Benford’s Law is a mathematical formula that
describes this distribution. Studies have shown that the law applies to a surprisingly large
number of data sets, and violations can raise questions as to whether the data have been
manipulated or artificially generated. Benford’s Law is commonly applied in accounting
applications to screen for manipulated or falsified financial statements.
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While the research studies cited above generally acknowledge
anomalies in the Libor quote data, they are merely suggestive of
wrongdoing. In fact, the 2008 study by Abrantes-Metz and her colleagues
specifically benchmarks the Libor against other contemporaneous shortterm, risk-free rates in periods not suspected of manipulation, applies those
benchmarks to the suspect periods, and finds that the average level of the
Libor does not deviate in a statistically significantly manner from these
benchmarks. Yet screens like this have helped trigger investigations that
will look for other evidence for or against the suspicious behavior.
Ultimately, very profitable manipulations could have happened within the
margin of error, making even low certainty results warrant further
investigation. The Libor litigation will provide a fruitful example of the
multiple uses of screens, and it has already shown how powerful these can
be in identifying situations warranting a closer look.
While the CFTC maintains extensive monitoring systems, journalists
and economists flagged the Libor disruption. There is no reason for
screening tools to be isolated to the government, and Libor shows the great
fruits of non-governmental screen use. There are many uses of screens for
market participants. It is critical for market players to know and anticipate
how they may be screened. For potential plaintiffs, screening techniques
may help them to note potential manipulation at all, the first step in
redressing it. Potential defendants would do well to establish screening
within their governance and compliance programs. Insofar as firms do not
wish to be the targets of investigations and lawsuits, they will attempt to
prevent their own staff from engaging in manipulative actions that can be
imputed to the firm. Screens can be a crucial tool in helping firms locate
and stop problems within their own house, rather than in a court later. It is
far better to hear about and remedy manipulation detected through an inhouse screen than after a conversation with regulators.
Any of the individual banks providing Libor quotes could have (and
some of them might have) used such methods themselves to identify the
same anomalies in real time. An internal audit or compliance function, by
anticipating these regulatory investigations, could have protected the banks
against allegations of malfeasance, or at least could have been an important
factor in convincing authorities that significant efforts had been made by
the company to detect any possible wrongdoing, if any did exist. They
could also have been used by the agencies themselves to flag the possibility
of wrongdoing.
B. Screens in Proof
Although recklessness will now suffice rather than intentional
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artificiality, econometric proof has not been reduced in importance for
adjudication. Artificiality may not be an element in 180.1 actions, but scale
of price distortion may be an important factor in computing damages, as
will causation.194 Screens can be a useful tool in establishing damages and
causation, and as well as pressing a 180.2 claim with respect to swaps. For
obvious reasons, any empirical approach to present or defend allegations of
fraud and manipulation relies not only on the actual facts of the case, but
also on the type of direct evidence available. For example, a 180.1 action
could be brought in part based on emails between traders that seem to
indicate the use of a fraudulent device. But trader-speak can often be
ambiguous, and supporting economic evidence may help prove or disprove
that their communications indicated fraud.
Economic analyses in general, and screens and other types of
empirical approaches in particular, can play critical roles in these
circumstances. Scholars have been calling for increased attention to
economic analyses for some time.195 The success of screens in focusing
attention on Libor and the new CFTC rules simply offer the most
opportune moment yet for commodities manipulation law to move forward.
The role of economic analysis and the economic expert can be very
important in inferring intent under these circumstances by performing a
variety of studies on what is “usual” market and trading behavior and what
may be considered “unusual” and potentially indicative of manipulation.
This section presents possible empirical analyses for hypothetical
situations that may be undertaken for particular types of cases.
1. Possible Empirical Analyses for a Hypothetical Case Brought
Under Rule 180.1
Imagine that the CFTC has brought allegations of conspiracy and
manipulation against traders in a financial services firm called Gospis and
brokers in a brokerage firm called Brokatus. Specifically, the CFTC
alleges that some brokers from Brokatus conspired to obtain new business
and increase existing business in swaps as well as in cash and futures
transactions from Gospis’ traders. This group of brokers (call it “allegedly
tainted brokers”) provided a variety of gifts to the aforementioned group of
traders (call it “allegedly tainted traders”), a practice that was not allowed
194. Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c)(10)(C)(ii) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §
9(10)(c)(ii)) (allowing treble damages).
195. See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 17, at 63 (prescribing that “the amended law should
explicitly prescribe, endorse, or recommend the use of statistical and econometric methods
to establish the existence of specific anomalous price and quantity relations” in order to
enhance the efficiency of U.S. future market anti-manipulation regulation).
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by either Brokatus or Gospis. The CFTC also put forward the theory that
the allegedly tainted brokers were of lower quality when compared to the
other brokers at Brokatus, which was the reason why they had to bribe
traders at Gospis.
An economic expert employed by one of the parties will undertake a
variety of analyses to determine whether there is any empirical support for
these allegations. There are fundamentally two inquiries to pursue. First,
was there a causal relationship between gifts and trade execution quality.
Second, was there an incentive for the tainted traders to actually select their
brokers based primarily on the gifts received.
On the first point of execution quality, one approach is to compare the
quality of execution of the pairs of allegedly tainted traders and brokers
during the allegation period against appropriately untainted benchmarks.
The quality of execution could be measured by the amount by which those
trades beat average market prices, thus producing benefits for Gospis. If
gifts were the reason why the tainted traders chose to place their trades with
the tainted brokers, then we should expect to observe a lower quality of
execution between these pairs and any other untainted pairs. There are
several untainted benchmarks to be considered: (i) the same pairs of
allegedly tainted traders and brokers before the allegation period; (ii) the
same allegedly tainted traders when placing their trades with untainted
brokers during the allegation period; (iii) untainted traders when placing
the orders with allegedly tainted brokers during the allegation period; and
(iv) untainted traders when placing their trades with untainted brokers.
The economic expert will search for lower execution quality for the
pairs of allegedly tainted traders with allegedly tainted brokers during the
allegation period, when compared to any of the four benchmarks above.
Changes in the relationships between allegedly tainted traders with
allegedly tainted brokers from before the allegation period to during the
allegation period would also be considered, and compared to changes
during the same periods of time between any of the benchmark groups.
Just as important as the choice of the benchmarks is the specification
of the model explaining quality of execution. It is important to frame the
analysis in the context of a multiple regression model so that a variety of
potentially relevant factors can be taken into consideration, and a measure
of materiality can be scientifically obtained through statistical significance.
Such factors to take into account are: the characteristics of the contracts
and swaps involved; the trading conditions on a daily basis (for example, if
there was any relevant news on those days); the time of the transaction
(was it in the last few minutes before floor trading closed for the day), or
time to floor trading close; market depth; market liquidity; floor versus
electronic trading; market volume for the day and during the last few
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minutes of floor trading when applicable; relative size of the trade in terms
of volume for the relevant time period; number of transactions in the last
few minutes; times when brokers received traders’ orders and execution
times of those trades; relevant sectors; specific transaction orders (as for
example, if the broker can break a large trade into several blocks or not)
and order types; portfolio manager instructions; multi-broker placements;
relevant price average values and volatility; recent relevant prices trends;
basis value when applicable (measured as the futures minus the spot/cash
price); residual interfund trades; number of other trades placed in the same
few minutes interval; day of the week; and potentially other factors.
With the results of these models, a variety of tests can be run in order
to establish any material differences in execution quality for the pairs of
allegedly tainted traders and brokers during the allegation period, when
compared to benchmarks.
Are the qualities of execution from the allegedly tainted pairs
statistically different from, in particular lower than, the qualities of
execution for any of the other benchmark pairs?
After taking into account all of the factors that may explain quality of
execution as outlined above, let’s consider the regression errors as
containing all other explanations for execution quality that were not
directly controlled for in our model. Do these regression errors differ in
terms of variances, and overall distributions, between the allegedly tainted
pairs and any of the benchmarks?
Does the execution quality of allegedly tainted pairs present the same
variability over time as those from benchmarks?
How do the trades from these pairs of allegedly tainted traders and
brokers compare to the overall universe of trades between all traders and all
brokers? Do they tend to be on the lower end of the distribution?
Are there either a larger number of negative qualities of execution for
the allegedly tainted trader and broker pairs, or more significant negative
values, when compared to the benchmarks?
Suppose there are 30 such pairs of allegedly tainted traders and
brokers, and that there is a universe of 450 pairs of traders and brokers that
are untainted (benchmarks (i)-(iv)). If we draw 10 random samples of
qualities of execution from the 450 untainted pairs of size 30 pairs each,
how do these compare to the qualities of execution of the 30 allegedly
tainted pairs? Can we distinguish the 30 allegedly tainted pairs against any
of the other random samples of the same size, in terms of any of the
relevant features of the quality of execution?
The same analyses that are carried out for the group of tainted traders
and brokers over time would also be undertaken at a more micro level, such
as the ones outlined below.
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On a daily basis, how does the intraday variability of the qualities of
execution for the allegedly tainted traders and brokers compare to the
intraday volatility for the remaining benchmarks?
Are there a larger proportion of negative qualities of execution for the
allegedly tainted pairs than for the benchmarks on a daily basis? Are the
negative values for the qualities of execution of the allegedly tainted pairs
larger in terms of magnitude than those of the untainted pairs, again on a
daily basis?
Amongst all of the 30 allegedly tainted pairs during the allegation
period, can we identify any particular pairs which seem more suspicious in
terms of the characteristics of the quality of execution, meaning that
performed worse in terms of quality of execution?
Amongst all of the 30 allegedly tainted pairs, what was the proportion
that performed better than the average of all trades, the same, and worse
than the average of all trades? How do these proportions compare to the
same proportions across all of the untainted pairs? And how do these
proportions compare with respect to those in 10 random samples of size 30
untainted pairs each?
Of course, other more specific analyses may also be undertaken by
defendants’ economic expert and the CFTC, but for the most part, their
core would be similar to those outlined above.
With respect to the second point on the incentive of traders to select
brokers based primarily on gifts received, these traders had strong financial
incentives to perform well. Traders had the incentive to choose the “right”
brokers so that their compensation could be maximized. Traders’
compensation was based on their financial performance, which is a
function of a volume-weighted price metric for all of their transactions, and
also of the classification of the traders’ work by their respective portfolio
managers.
Hence, a starting analysis on the incentive question would compare
the quarterly compensations for the allegedly tainted pairs of traders and
brokers against the compensations of the same benchmarks in (i)-(iv)
factoring in other relevant and determining factors. The analysis would
pose similar questions about the compensations of these allegedly tainted
pairs as those in (1) through (9) above. Of course, this analysis is quarterly
rather than daily, and other important factors may also have to be
controlled for when conducting an appropriate compensation analysis such
as tenure as a trader and the percentage of trades in swaps, cash and
futures, among others. Additionally, empirical analyses addressing the
timing of transactions between allegedly tainted pairs and the reception of
gifts would possibly also be undertaken.
Additional analysis related to allegations of a conspiracy would also

VERSTEIN - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

410

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/3/2013 12:57 PM

[Vol. 15:2

have to be presented. Screens could be applied to identify clusters of
brokers that seem to differentiate themselves from all other brokers with
respect to characteristics relevant for the alleged conspiracy.196
2. Possible Empirical Analyses for a Hypothetical Case Brought
Under Rule 180.2
In allegations of actual manipulation, we may expect the CFTC to
continue following the four tests addressing the following questions: (1)
did the accused have the ability to influence market prices; (2) was there an
intent to create or affect prices not reflecting legitimate forces of supply
and demand; (3) did artificial prices exist; and (4) did the accused cause
such artificial prices.
An economic expert on an alleged manipulation case will often start
by considering two main lines of inquiry. First, she will assess whether the
defendant had the capability of affecting prices, and secondly, whether an
artificial price was generated as a consequence of the alleged conduct.
Depending on the specifics of the case, the incentive test may come in
sooner or later in the analysis by the economic expert.
As an example, let’s suppose the following allegations of direct and
indirect manipulation of NYMEX settlement prices. The CFTC alleges
that a particular individual, “the defendant,” has manipulated downwards
the NYMEX settlement prices for commodity A on specific days during the
period of 2002 through the end of 2004, and as a consequence it indirectly
manipulated downwards the NYMEX settlement prices for closely related
commodity B. Allegedly, the defendant was selling large quantities of this
commodity on or about the last minute of floor trading, offering to sell at
prices noticeably lower than those seen in the market at that moment in
time. Allegedly, the defendant entered the market in days specifically
relevant for his trading in other commodities. Namely, the defendant had a
large amount of contracts for commodity B, which is closely related to
commodity A. In particular, the defendant had entered into contracts to
purchase large volumes of commodity B, whose price has a high and
positive correlation with the price of commodity A. According to the
CFTC, since the defendant’s positions were significantly larger in the
market for commodity B than in the market for commodity A, what the
defendant lost in terms of selling A at “too low prices” he more than offset

196. For an explanation of a variety of screens that can be used when studying alleged
conspiracies, see Abrantes-Metz & Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies, supra note 176;
Abrantes-Metz & Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies Extended, supra note 176; A.B.A.,
PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER ANTITRUST FEDERAL LAWS, ch. VIII (2010).
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in profit by buying B at “too low prices.”
We will start by focusing first on the question of whether the
defendant had the capability to affect market prices. The economist must
first define the relevant market. Should the relevant market be essentially
restricted to commodities A and B transacted on the floor of the NYMEX,
or should it also incorporate electronic transactions on these commodities?
Should transactions on these commodities performed at the London Metal
Exchange (LME) be included? Should other closely related commodities
also be included in the relevant market?
Secondly, the economist must determine how large are the trades
placed by the defendant compared to the overall market volume to establish
whether the defendant had the capability to manipulate prices.
Determinations will have to be made as to the relevant time period of
trading and on the location and type of trading as well. In our case, the
allegations are that the defendant manipulated NYMEX settlement prices
for commodities A and B by trading large quantities in the floor in the last
few minutes of floor trading. Clearly, the economist needs to focus on the
NYMEX settlement prices and on the volume during the last few minutes
of trading, though the overall daily volume may also be relevant.
Additionally, both floor and electronic trading during the last minutes of
floor trading are part of the calculations of the NYMEX settlement prices
for both commodities; therefore both of these should be taken into account
when estimating the defendant’s relative market size. Often, individual
floor trade volumes are not publicly available, but sometimes it is possible
for the economist to provide an estimate of these in order to infer the
relative size of each trade.
Once the above determinations are made, the economist will then be
able to start analyzing whether prices on those markets were artificial
during the days in which manipulation allegedly occurred, and in case such
price artificiality is found, whether the defendant’s actions were the cause.
Let’s suppose that in this hypothetical the relevant market is defined by the
two commodities, and the transactions involved are those placed on the
floor of the NYMEX and electronically. Some of the approaches that may
be relevant in this context are described below.
One natural approach is to use a market model to “screen” the markets
for price artificiality. The question is, “had the CFTC built such a screen to
flag unexpected patterns in these NYMEX settlement prices, would it have
flagged the days in which the defendant sold commodity A as days in
which the NYMEX settlement price was unexpectedly low?”
Let’s focus on commodity A, as the analysis for commodity B is
similar in nature. The economist may construct a market model that
explains variation in the daily changes in NYMEX settlement prices for
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commodity A based on various exogenous variables that are not affected by
the defendant’s trading in this market. A market model incorporates
returns (or changes) in an overall market index to track the performance of
the entire economy, a commodity-specific index such as a spot index, and
perhaps other factors such as ETFs. These models typically have a high
explanatory power for changes in the dependent variable, NYMEX
settlement prices changes in this case.
The next step is to analyze the excess returns for the NYMEX
settlement prices, i.e., the part of the change in the NYMEX settlement
prices which cannot be explained by legitimate changes in the variables
used in the model, and to correlate these with the defendant’s trading
activity. Is there a statistically significant correlation between negative and
statistically significant excess returns for the NYMEX settlement prices for
commodity A and the days that the defendant was in the market selling
these futures contracts at allegedly “too low” prices?
Now, an absence of correlation may be compelling evidence of an
absence of causation. But the reverse is far more tenuous: there can be a
number of reasons why two things may be correlated without assuming that
one causes the other. One of the most likely is that we have omitted a
relevant factor from our market model that drives both the NYMEX
settlement price and the defendant’s decision to sell that commodity on the
same day, generating a positive correlation between the two. Such a factor
could be a particular piece of news on that commodity on that day, or
simply the fact that the market volume has attained a high or a low, or even
news related to monetary policy, for example. Hence, causality needs to be
appropriately addressed in the context of an event study, in which relevant
news are researched and timed to changes in relevant prices so that the
cause of the price change can be identified, and intraday analyses may well
be required.
Another possible analysis based on the screening model is to look into
the transitions from selling and not selling the commodity. Divide the
space of actions into in-in, in-out, out-out, out-in: (i) “in-in” are days in
which the defendant was in the market selling the commodity and
continued in the market the following day; (ii) “out-in” represent moving
from a day in which he did not sell the commodity to a day in which he did,
and comparable definitions for out-out and in-out. The economic expert
may test whether there are sudden price jumps downwards on out-in days,
and sudden price jumps upwards on in-out days, which would be consistent
with the allegations of manipulation downwards of commodity A. A
variety of other tests could also be performed in this framework.
Other, more common tests of price artificiality include the analysis of
the basis for the relevant contracts, defined as the difference between the
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futures price today for the relevant contract minus the spot or cash price
today for the same commodity. Comparisons can be made between the
basis during days in which the defendant sold commodity A against those
days in which he did not, or between prior and post alleged manipulation
periods, or against the basis of other untainted contracts. Is the basis for
the allegedly manipulated contracts negative (i.e., does backwardation
exist), or more negative on days in which the defendant sold futures
contracts for commodity A at allegedly “too low” prices? Movements in
the basis may also have to be controlled for in terms of other relevant
market variables.
Yet another set of analyses that an economist will need to undertake
are those related to the intent to manipulate, as discussed in section 2.
Despite the difficulty in analyzing intent, an economic expert may have
several potentially relevant analyses to pursue.
Analyses related to liquidity, market depth and price discovery,
described above in the context of price artificiality, may all also play an
important role when addressing intent. If the defendant intends to affect
prices, it is easier to do so when trading during times of the day in which
liquidity is low, which corresponds to times when the market does not have
much depth, or on particular days in which that is more the case than
others. Additionally, he may more easily affect prices if he tries to affect
the market in which price discovery takes place.
Analyses of trading patterns may be critical when addressing intent.
They do not require a price effect, but simply flag trading patterns
consistent with a higher likelihood of intent to affect prices as being
“unusual” in some sense for these markets. One such approach is to
empirically study the reasons why the defendant decided to trade in the
specified markets on the particular days that he did, using factors that can
be measured. Was his decision to trade based on relevant exogenous
events? Does he typically trade on days in which volume is high, or days
in which particular macroeconomic news occur? Decision-making models
may be developed and estimated to determine the factors more highly
correlated with the defendant’s trading patterns to see if these, rather than
an intent to affect price, can explain his trading pattern.
An economic expert will likely also want to study profitability from
the alleged conduct. She will compute actual profitability from this
strategy and compare it against defendant’s profitability in other moments
in time. She may also study whether the alleged misconduct is timed to the
defendant’s quarterly assessments on which his compensation will be
determined. Additionally, she may estimate shadow strategies that the
defendant would likely have undertaken had he not traded in the
commodities markets allegedly manipulated, to estimate what would but-
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for profits have been under such shadow trading patterns and compare them
against his actual profits.
The lower CFTC burden of proof enables more elaborate, more indepth, and more creative economic and empirical approaches. With
proportionally less emphasis on the subjective state of intent, the new
recklessness standard denotes greater willingness to consider objective
indicia of manipulation. Although the law has always made use of
empirical proofs in manipulation, it has done so grudgingly at times. The
new rules create new reasons and opportunities for the law to make use of
economic expertise.
C. Screens at the Pleading Stage197
Many argued that our pre-existing manipulation laws were sufficient
to address the challenges manipulation poses. For example, Pirrong
implied that the faults in Commodity Exchange Act enforcement came
largely from the unwillingness of the courts and agencies to engage in
statistical analysis of prices—but that the law itself was sufficient.198 One
student note examining Libor recommended cosmetic changes to the
BBA’s Libor governance, but saw no need for legal recommendations,199
and another note surveyed manipulation scholarship in the wake of the
Sumitomo copper manipulation and argued that existing laws should
suffice.200 For those who were content with the status quo, Dodd-Frank has
created open season for manipulation enforcement and given regulators too
much power.
While the new rules extend their reach to cover transactions that
would have eluded enforcement before, there are also concerns about the
power of the dramatic expansion of regulatory authority under Dodd-Frank.
Just as the Rules will require economic methods to operate, their dizzying
scope should be limited by broad application of these methods at the
pleading stage. With new recklessness and attempt prongs, many more
defendants can be drawn into investigation and litigation. The defensive
use of econometric tools will prove vital for innocent defendants who seek
to avoid suit. Ideally, the courts will be receptive to such approaches,

197. This section extends analysis in Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Design and Implementation
of Screens and Their Use by Defendants, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON.,
Sept. 2, 2011.
198. Pirrong, supra note 50.
199. Justin T. Wong, Libor Left in Limbo; A Call for More Reform, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 365 (2009).
200. Benjamin E. Kozinn, The Great Copper Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a
Problem in the Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 243 (2000).
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allowing economic proof at the pleading stages as defendants advert to
Iqbal and Twombly. As discussed in Abrantes-Metz (2010), some of these
patterns may indeed be sufficiently unusual as to pass the higher standards
for pleading antitrust conspiracy claims set forth by the Supreme Court
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.201 This section urges that the
failure to trigger any screen may be useful to a court in determining
whether a plaintiff has pled with sufficient specificity to overcome
Twombly.
If, by contrast, courts allow their unfettered use by the Commission
and plaintiffs, the new rules could see substantial costs and risks for
legitimate market participants and lower the quality and liquidity of price
discovery and hedging. Concerns were voiced by a number of market
participants and experts in comments submitted during the rule-making
period for sections 180.1-180.2, expressing worries about the proposed
rules. The American Bar Association emphasized that the addition of the
OTC swap market to the scope of the manipulation rules makes it all the
more important that rules be clear. Unlike market-based participants, OTC
participants do not yet have real-time feedback from the Commission or
exchange as to the legality of their activities.202
Platts’s comment, for instance, focused on its role providing price
discovery and the ways in which the proposed rules against price
manipulation could potentially create a disincentive to the entities that
provide Platts with information, hindering its data gathering activities.
Argus’s comment was straightforwardly critical. Argus is a major provider
of price information on various physical commodities. Its concern was that
“the proposed rules may unnecessarily chill the voluntary submission of
transaction related data by market participants to compilers of price
indices.”203 As Platts put it, “[e]ffective price discovery in physical energy
markets depends on the willingness of companies to recognize the
collective good of engaging in price formation through the voluntary and
transparent reporting of trade data, including bids, offers and actual
transactions, to publishers of price assessments such as Platts.”204 Platts
also indicated that the good faith exception for false reporting that exists

201. 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007).
202. A.B.A. Derivatives Section Comment Letter on Rules 180.1 and 180.2 at 4;
William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives: The Need for a
Comparative Institution Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. 111, 112 (1995) (“United States futures
exchanges are much more heavily regulated than the markets for OTC derivatives.”);
Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55
MD. L. REV. 1, 55 (1996) (discussing regulation of swaps).
203. Argus comment on Rules 180.1 and 180.2, at 1.
204. Platts Comment Letter on Rules 180.1 and 180.2, at 1.
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under Dodd Frank had a long and successful provenance, dating back to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 2003 Policy Statement on
Natural Gas and Electric Price Indices, and successfully argued for its
similar application here.205
Though the outer reaches of the new rule’s power is extensive, its true
reach will depend on judicial treatment. In particular, courts may be
inclined to moderate its power at the pleading stage. If legitimate market
participants can dispense with the cost of litigating CEA claims before
those expenses mount, than much of the uncertainty and cost will be
relieved.206
We describe below the process of developing a new screen for the
purpose of evaluating a purported manipulation. Innovative screens like
this one can help particularly at the pleading stage. If the plaintiff’s
manipulation claim can be cheaply and efficiently discredited, then more
resources can be dedicated to meritorious claims and innocent defendants
can avoid serious costs. The use of these tools will be more important than
ever in establishing limits to the power of the new rules.
Innovations in screens, typically driven by litigation parties, can, if
credited in court, constitute genuine improvements in how and what legal
factfinders can know. Party innovations can also drive the creation of tools
that are subsequently added to the arsenal of tools for prosecuting financial
manipulation by regulators.
Given their tremendous complexity,
commodity manipulation will often require the development of new screens
specifically tailored to the allegations at hand. Below we provide a closing
descriptive summary of the many uses that can be made of screens.
D. Uses of Screens
A screen is a statistical test aimed at identifying potential market
misconduct. Its uses are many, but non-litigation detection and litigation
are the primary families of uses.
1. Detection
Perhaps the primary use that is made of screens is detection.207

205. Platts Comment Letter on Rules 180.1 and 180.2 at 2.
206. One important factor to note in adjudicating between the promise and overbreadth
of the new CFTC rules is the argument of Keith Hylton that pleading standards should
depend on the evidentiary demands and social costs of a given form of litigation. See Keith
N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and Summary
Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39 (2008).
207. Below we provide examples using just one kind of screen that one of the co-
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Detection involves employing a screen to identify a potential manipulation,
as was discussed in depth above. Detection is of use to multiple
individuals impacted or interested in potential market manipulations.
Competition authorities and government regulators will want to make
extensive use of screens to ease the work of identifying potential
manipulations requiring regulatory scrutiny. Academics interested in the
issue will want to employ them, as will enterprising plaintiffs who want to
corroborate their case.208 Further afield are additional uses for screens.
Companies considering prospective joint ventures or mergers and
acquisitions stand to benefit from identifying potential liabilities. Selfregulatory authorities, whether industry wide or specific, may also want to
use screens in monitoring their members. Lastly, corporate internal
compliance stands to benefit enormously from well-applied screens, which
may nip forthcoming manipulations in the bud.
2. Litigation
The other primary forum for the effective and efficient use of screens
is in litigation.209 Every constituent of the litigation process will benefit
from the apt use of screens. Screens are often used, as discussed above, for
identifying potential manipulation and can be aggressively utilized at the
pleading and proof stage. Importantly, though, screens can also be used to
exonerate innocent defendants, potentially at each of these stages. In both
cases, it is the factfinder that also benefits from the appropriate use of
statistical evidence. Moreover, this is true at unexpected phases of an
action. Class certification and damages will also potentially benefit from
screen application.210
CONCLUSION
The law of commodities manipulation has been definitionally

authors has also successfully employed. See, e.g., Cindy Durtschi, William Hillison & Carl
Pacini, The Effective Use of Benford’s Law to Assist in Detecting Fraud in Accounting Data,
5 J. FORENSIC ACCOUNTING 17 (2004); Hal Varian, Benford’s Law, 26:3 AM. STATISTICIAN
65 (1972); Stephen Battersby, Statistics Hint at Fraud in Iranian Election, NEW SCIENTIST,
June 24, 2009, at 10.
208. Abrantes-Metz, Screens for Conspiracies and their Multiple Applications, supra
note 176; Rosa Abrantes-Metz et al, Is the Market Being Fooled? An Error-Based Screen
for Manipulation (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007348.
209. Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Why and How to Use Empirical Screens in Antitrust
Compliance, COMPETITION POLICY INT. J. (forthcoming 2012).
210. Abrantes-Metz, supra note 176.
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confused, doctrinally challenged, and nearly unwinnable in practice. In the
aftermath of a disastrous global financial crisis, the CFTC has adopted a
new set of regulations of striking scope and depth. This Article analyzed
the tectonic shift those regulations represented for the legal landscape and
made three primary claims. First, manipulation in financial markets
increasingly requires powerful tools for detection and prosecution. The
inclusion of swaps within the CEA manipulation regime, and the
worldwide focus on Libor, underscores that the new CFTC rules have
dramatic advantages alongside their significant potential for abuse.
Second, that the new CFTC rules require more complex, subtle, and
innovative economic analyses. While engaging the debate at a theoretical
level, we also provided extensive demonstrations of how a sophisticated
economic approach might work under the new law. Third, we argued for
an increased role for empiricism in the evidentiary law surrounding
manipulation, re-engaging a decades-old debate on the place of economic
analyses in the law.

